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REPLACING MONELL LIABILITY WITH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
FOR MUNICIPAL DEFENDANTS IN 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
LITIGATION 
Edward C. Dawson* 
Abstract 
Under current doctrine interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, local governments are not subject to 
respondeat superior for their officers’ constitutional 
torts but can only be held liable for those torts if 
the plaintiff can show the violation was caused by 
the local government’s policy or custom. The 
Supreme Court has developed complicated, 
stringent, and heavily criticized tests plaintiffs must 
meet to show the requisite policy or custom, which 
require plaintiffs to plead, discover, and prove 
facts about municipal policies, practices, and 
patterns of conduct well beyond the confines of the 
individual case. The Court has refused, however, to 
allow municipal defendants to invoke the qualified 
immunity defense available to individual officers, 
which allows an officer to defeat liability and 
escape suit if she can show that her conduct did not 
violate the plaintiff’s clearly established 
constitutional rights.   
Building on other scholars’ criticisms of the 
doctrine, this Article proposes that § 1983 doctrine 
should be changed so that municipal defendants 
are liable in respondeat superior for their officers’ 
torts but are allowed to invoke their officers’ 
qualified immunity defense. This Article supports 
that proposal based primarily on the following 
policy grounds. First, it would make § 1983 
litigation simpler and more efficient, by eliminating 
the complicated and discovery-intensive municipal 
 
* Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law.  My thanks for helpful comments on 
this Article to participants at an SIU faculty workshop, and at the Central States Law Schools 
Association, and to Jennifer Lancaster, Brian Scott, and Kathleen Whitworth for their helpful research 
assistance. 
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liability doctrine and by focusing litigation on the 
narrower legal question of qualified immunity. 
Second, it would improve local governments’ 
incentives under the statute. Replacing municipal-
liability doctrine with respondeat superior would 
replace the current incentive to insulate 
policymakers from traceable connections to 
constitutional violations with an incentive to 
monitor and prevent violations of clearly 
established constitutional law, while allowing 
municipal qualified immunity would prevent 
municipal governments from being exposed to 
expansive new liabilities. Third, the changes would 
make cases against local governments easier to 
prove and potentially more valuable for more 
deserving plaintiffs, and eliminate recovery for less 
deserving plaintiffs. Finally, the changes would 
better serve the federalism policy of respect for 
state and local governments that underpins the 
Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence, because they would 
eliminate direct federal court scrutiny into local 
policies, customs, and practices and so give local 
governments more flexibility to choose policies and 
practices to effectively deter constitutional 
violations by their officers.  
The Article then briefly explains why the proposal 
is both possible and feasible.  It is possible because 
it can be justified in terms of the statute’s text, 
legislative history, and background in common 
law, in the same way as the Court’s current 
doctrine can be so justified. And it is feasible 
because (1) the Court has often made major 
changes in its § 1983 doctrine based on policy; (2) 
the Court is notably enthusiastic about qualified 
immunity but has been more equivocal about 
municipal liability; and (3) the proposal has appeal 
as a compromise that takes from municipal 
defendants by expanding their responsibility while 
giving to them an additional, powerful affirmative 
defense.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Under the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, 
municipal defendants1 are not subject to respondeat superior liability for 
their officers’ constitutional torts.2  Instead, cities may be held liable for 
the constitutional torts of their officers only when the plaintiff can show 
that the city is responsible for those torts under the doctrine of municipal 
liability, which requires connecting the violation of the plaintiff’s rights 
to a municipal policy or custom.3 This doctrine of municipal liability is 
convoluted4 and can require difficult inquiries into which city officials 
are “policymakers” under state law on local government,5 into whether a 
official was acting in a “local” or “state” capacity,6 into the extent of 
departmental “custom” authorizing constitutional violations,7 into 
individual cities’ training and hiring processes,8 and into demanding 
questions about causation and fault.9  
While municipal defendants can only be held liable by proving 
municipal liability under these complicated rules, those defendants are 
not allowed to assert qualified immunity as a defense to liability that is 
available to individual officers.10 The qualified immunity defense allows 
an officer to defeat liability (and escape suit) when the officer can show 
that their conduct, whether or not it was unconstitutional, did not violate 
clearly established rights of which a reasonable officer should have 
known.11 The qualified immunity defense gives individual officers 
“breathing room” to make judgment calls that may be wrong but are 
 
 1. This Article uses “municipal defendants” to describe government entities that can be held 
liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 because they are not “arms of the state” entitled to state sovereign 
immunity.  Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).   
 2. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.   
 3. Id. at 694-95.   
 4. See, e.g., Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 5. See, e.g., Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986).  
 6. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997) (analyzing Alabama constitution and 
state law to determine whether Alabama sheriff was state or local policymaker).   
 7. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). 
 8. See, e.g., Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). 
 9. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1989). 
 10. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).  
 11. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 801 (1982).   
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within a margin of error allowed by current, clearly established 
constitutional law,12 but current doctrine does not give municipal 
defendants that same margin of error.  
The current state of § 1983 doctrine, and in particular the doctrines of 
both municipal liability and qualified immunity, have been heavily 
criticized by a consensus of scholars,13 as well as by several jurists.14 
Many critics call for eliminating the “policy and custom” doctrine and 
replacing it with simple respondeat superior liability for cities—that is, 
making a municipal defendant liable any time one of its officers violates 
a defendant’s constitutional rights, whether or not the right was clearly 
established at the time of the officer’s conduct.15 Others have called for 
abolishing, reworking, or severely curtailing the doctrine of qualified 
immunity.16 Finally, most closely related to this Article’s argument, in 
2013, John Jeffries proposed a “unified theory of constitutional torts” 
under which, among other things, strict municipal liability would be 
abolished and a modified qualified immunity rule would become the 
sole liability rule for constitutional tort litigation.17  
This Article proposes replacing municipal liability “policy or custom” 
doctrine with  respondeat superior liability for municipal defendants, 
but allowing municipal defendants to invoke the same qualified 
immunity defense available to the individual officers whose conduct is 
the basis for the claims against the municipality.18 Cities would thus 
remain defendants in § 1983 suits and become automatically liable for 
the constitutional torts of their officers, but cities would be liable only 
when the officer herself is liable because she is not entitled to qualified 
 
 12. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (“Qualified immunity ‘gives 
government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’” (quoting Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986))). 
 13. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA L. REV. 207, 
208 (2013) [hereinafter Jeffries, The Liability Rule] (“The proliferation of inconsistent policies and 
arbitrary distinctions renders constitutional tort law functionally unintelligible.”);  Karen M. Blum, 
Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 913-
14 [hereinafter Blum, The Maze] (“There is a growing consensus among practitioners, scholars, and 
judges that Section 1983 is no longer serving its original and intended function as a vehicle for 
remedying violations of constitutional rights, that it is broken in many ways, and that it is sorely in need 
of repairs.”). 
 14. See e.g., Brown, 520 U.S. at 410  (Breyer, J., dissenting); Pembauer, 475 U.S. at 487 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Blum, The Maze, supra note 13 at 914; 
Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 208 (each summarizing criticisms).   
 15. See, e.g., Blum, The Maze, supra note 13, at 962-63.; Brown, 520 U.S. at 434-37 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 16. Will Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45 (2018) [hereinafter 
Baude]. 
 17. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 270. 
 18. See infra Part II.A.     
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immunity.19  
This Article argues for these changes primarily and initially on policy 
grounds.20 First, they would make § 1983 litigation simpler and more 
efficient. Litigation will be more narrowly focused on one doctrine—the 
qualified immunity analysis, which asks whether the officer’s conduct 
violated the constitution and if so whether the violation was clearly 
established under the law in existence at the time of the conduct.21 In 
most cases, plaintiffs will no longer have to pursue, and cities will no 
longer have to manage, time consuming and expensive discovery about 
the city’s policies, practices, and patterns beyond the events that are the 
basis of a particular case.22 Because municipal defendants tend to 
indemnify their officers, 23  this discovery is essentially a wasteful 
sideshow. As a practical matter, the qualified immunity analysis already 
almost always determines whether or not the city will pay out money, 
except in cases where a plaintiff can hold a municipal defendant strictly 
liable but the officer escapes liability based on qualified immunity.24 
Eliminating the municipal liability doctrine will eliminate that waste.25  
It will also improve judicial efficiency because it will extract the federal 
courts from having to inquire into difficult state law questions about 
which officials are policymakers,26 or whether particular officials are 
“state” or “local,”27 as well as from having to review the training, hiring, 
and discipline policies of municipal governments.28 At the same time, 
however, plaintiffs that want to contest and challenge municipal policies 
 
 19. If multiple officers were sued, the city’s liability would depend on the liability of each 
defendant officer; the city would only escape liability if all officers were either not liable or immune.  
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 
 22. See, e.g., G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator’s View of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct 
Policy and Practice Cases, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 747, 752-53 (1999) [hereinafter “Taylor, A Litigator’s 
View”] (describing discovery required in municipal liability cases).   
 23. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 911-913 (2014) 
(describing empirical study concluding that essentially all §1983 judgments and settlements are paid by 
governments, not officers).  
 24. See, e.g., Blum, The Maze, supra note 13, at 920; Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, 
at 235-36. 
 25. See Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 235-36. 
 26. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737-38 (1989); Pembauer v. City of 
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1986) (each considering whether particular officials were local 
“policymakers” whose acts could expose the municipal defendant to liability). 
 27. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 787-88 (1997) (holding that because an 
Alabama sheriff was a State and not a local policymaker, the sheriff’s conduct could not expose the 
county to liability). 
 28. See, e.g., Craig B. Futterman, H. Melissa Mather, and Melanie Miles, Use of Statistical 
Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and Disciplinary Practices: The Chicago Police Department's 
Broken System, 1 DePaul Journal for Social Justice 251 (2007) (describing statistical analysis performed 
in attempt to make out Monell claim against City of Chicago) [hereinafter “Futterman et al., Chicago’s 
Broken System”]; Taylor, A Litigator’s View, supra note 22, at 752-53.  
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and practices will still be able to do so through requests for injunctive 
relief and class actions.29 
Second, the proposed changes will give municipal defendants better 
incentives to try and avoid violating citizens’ rights without saddling 
them with broad new liabilities.30 Replacing municipal liability doctrine 
with respondeat superior will replace municipal defendants’ incentive 
under current doctrine to insulate policymakers from traceable 
connections to constitutional violations with an incentive to ensure that 
those policymakers monitor and prevent violations of clearly established 
constitutional law.  This should happen because liability would now 
depend on whether the officer violated the plaintiff’s clearly established 
rights,31 and not whether the plaintiff could prove a link between the 
violation and the municipal defendant’s executive policies or 
policymakers.32  At the same time, expanding qualified immunity to 
municipal defendants will prevent exposing municipal governments to 
expansive new liabilities and over-deterring them for robust 
performance of governmental functions.  This is desirable both in itself 
and also because the Supreme Court would be very unlikely to adopt 
any change that massively expanded municipal liability.33 The proposed 
changes would also eliminate strict liability for municipal defendants in 
circumstances where the violation was one that should not have been 
foreseen under the law at the time of the violation,34 which will better 
serve the purposes of the statute by limiting municipal liability to 
deterrable violations (i.e., ones that could have been foreseen).35 Finally, 
to the extent the change expands municipal liability beyond the status 
quo, it will tend to do so for cases of severe violations by “rogue 
officers,” in which it is particularly unjust to leave plaintiffs with no 
remedy. 
Third, the changes would make cases against local governments 
 
 29. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Chicago, 143 F. Supp. 3d 741, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (denying 
motion to dismiss class action claims challenging Chicago police practices).  
 30. Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J) 
(arguing that Monell doctrine is best understood “as simply having crafted a compromise rule that 
protect the budgets of local governments from automatic liability for their employees’ wrongs, driven by 
a concern about public budgets and the potential extent of taxpayer liability”). 
 31. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).   
 32. See, e.g., Smith, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 753 (analyzing whether violations could be traced to 
policymakers).  
 33. See, e.g., Blum, The Maze, supra note 13, at 920 (arguing that the Court seems unlikely to 
impose strict respondeat superior on municipal defendants any time soon); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 
471 U.S. 808, 844 (1985), (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Court’s “policy” requirement under 
Monell is mainly driven by fear of municipal bankruptcies due to strict respondeat superior liability); 
Shields, 746 F.3d at 791-92 (Monell doctrine is best understood as a compromise designed to prevent 
excessive municipal liability). 
 34. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 666 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 35. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 244-46. 
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easier to prove and potentially more valuable for plaintiffs whose 
liability cases are strong.  Eliminating the need for plaintiffs to plead, 
discover, and prove facts about municipal policies and customs will 
make it easier for deserving plaintiffs to surmount the procedural hurdle 
of a motion to dismiss claims against municipal defendants under the 
heighted Twombly/Iqbal standard of pleading, 36 because those plaintiffs 
no longer will have to plead facts about municipal policy, practices, 
patterns of past violation, and training that can be difficult for plaintiffs 
to identify and plead without discovery. Further, the fact that municipal 
defendants will stay in the case so long as the case against the individual 
officer is viable may increase the settlement or verdict value of the case 
to a prevailing plaintiff.  At the same time, recovery will be eliminated 
for plaintiffs’ whose cases are least based in the fault of the 
defendants—plaintiffs who cannot demonstrate that the officer’s 
conduct violated clearly established constitutional law.37   
Finally, the proposal will also better serve the policy of federalism 
that the Court has said is an important reason for its doctrine on the 
limits of liability under § 1983,38 by reducing federal court intrusion into 
local policy and giving local governments more flexibility to choose 
policies they believe will reduce violations of federal rights.39  Because 
plaintiffs will no longer have to show policy or custom to hold a 
municipal defendant liable, federal courts will no longer be in the 
position of scrutinizing and second-guessing those policies. Municipal 
defendants, in turn, will have more flexibility to choose policies that 
they think will best prevent officers from violating constitutional rights;  
and, if they choose poorly, they will be held liable for their officers’ 
violations of clearly established constitutional rights.  
Part I of this Article gives the legal background for the proposal. It 
explains the origins of the current status quo under which municipal 
defendants can only be held liable by showing policy or custom, but 
may not assert the qualified immunity defense.  It then reviews the 
evolution of the municipal liability and qualified immunity doctrines 
since then, with particular focus on the difficulties faced by the Court 
(and lower courts) in defining what must be shown for a municipal 
entity to be held liable for the constitutional torts of its officers. Finally, 
it reviews scholars’ and jurists’ criticisms of this status quo. In 
 
 36. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. (2009); see 
also Blum, The Maze, supra note 13, at 916 (noting that “[m]unicipal liability claims have become 
procedurally more difficult for plaintiffs to assert” in the wake of those two cases).  
 37. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation For Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance 
of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 89 (1989).  
 38. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). 
 39. See infra Part II.D. 
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particular, it examines John Jeffries’ proposal for eliminating strict 
municipal liability and adopting a modified qualified immunity as the 
default liability rule for constitutional torts,40 on which this Article’s 
arguments build and expand. 
Part II explains the proposal and the policy arguments in its favor: 
improved efficiency, better deterrence for cities, easier and better 
recovery for plaintiffs with strong cases and less recovery for plaintiffs 
with weak cases, and furthering federalism by reducing federal courts’ 
intrusions into state and local policy and law.  
Part III then briefly explains how the proposed changes to the 
doctrine are both possible and feasible.  The changes are possible 
because they can be justified by conventional41 sources of statutory 
interpretation—text, legislative history, and common law—at least to 
the same extent as the Court’s current doctrinal choices can be so 
justified.  The Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence has been mostly policy-
driven, and only broadly constrained by conventional sources; the 
changes proposed by this Article can be justified to that extent.   
Also, the changes are feasible in the sense that it is possible that the 
Court might actually make the proposed changes to the doctrine of § 
1983.  First, as noted, the Court has a history of making significant 
changes to the doctrine as a response to perceived policy problems in § 
1983 litigation. Second, the Court is currently very enthusiastic about 
qualified immunity doctrine,42 while it seems much less so about the 
doctrine of municipal liability. Finally, in addition to the policy 
arguments in its favor, the proposal also has appeal as a compromise or 
bargain—it takes away from municipal defendants by making them 
liable in respondeat superior, but it gives them the benefit of the 
powerful qualified immunity defense. 
I.  ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CRITIQUES OF THE STATUS QUO  
Section 1983 allows a private individual to sue state and local 
government officials, as well as local governments, for officials’ 
violations of plaintiffs’ federal constitutional rights under color of state 
law.43 Section 1983 suits are, and for decades have been, the primary 
 
 40. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13. 
 41. “Conventional” here means sources other than policy-based sources.  See Baude, supra note 
16, at 2 (describing these as “technical” sources of interpretation).  
 42. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 16, at 41; Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of 
Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. 62, 63 (2016), [hereinafter Kinports, Quiet Expansion of 
Qualified Immunity] (each noting, and criticizing, the Court’s great enthusiasm for defendant-friendly 
rulings on qualified immunity).  
 43. 42 U.S.C. §1983. The statute also allows suit for a limited set of violations of federal 
statutory rights, See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). This 
9
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vehicle for private enforcement of federal constitutional rights against 
state and local officials and governments.44 
Section 1983 was originally enacted after the Civil War as part of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871.45 It allows monetary liability, as well as 
injunctive relief, against “persons” who deprive others of constitutional 
or statutory rights “under color of law.”46 For nearly a century after it 
was passed, the statute was mostly disused,47 until the Supreme Court in 
Monroe v. Pape,48  revived it as a meaningful federal constraint on state 
and local government officials by holding that the statute could be 
applied to constitutional violations by officials who acted under a badge 
of state authority, even if their conduct was not authorized by state 
law.49  
This holding created modern § 1983 litigation50 and led, over the past 
half-century, to the Court’s development of a complex doctrine to 
govern liability and defenses under the statute.51 In modern practice, § 
1983 suits plead violations of many different substantive constitutional 
rights and arise in a wide variety of factual situations. The statute has 
become arguably the most important vehicle for enforcing federal 
constitutional rights against state and local officials and governments.52   
This Article considers the intersection of two aspects of § 1983 
doctrine:  (1) municipal liability—the rules for whether and when 
municipal entities can be held liable based on constitutional violations 
 
article, however, focuses only on constitutional violations because they are  “the most frequently 
litigated claims” under section 1983. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 728 
(1999) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 44. See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing 
Bivens After Minneci, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 1473, 1502 (2013) (referring to section “1983, the principal 
means of enforcing constitutional rights”).  
 45. Enforcement Act of 1871, Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).  
 46. 42 U.S.C §1983.  
 47. See, e.g., Harry Blackmun, Section 1983 and the Protection of Individual Rights: Will the 
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10-17 (1985) (describing the post-
Reconstruction disuse and retraction of civil-rights laws).  
 48. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 49. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (holding that government officers could be held 
liable under section 1983 for official conduct even when that conduct was not directed or authorized by 
state law).  
 50. See, e.g., Paul Howard Morris, Note: The Impact of Constitutional Liability on the 
Privatization Movement After Richardson v. McKnight, 52 VAND. L. REV. 489, 499-500 (1999) (“In 
contrast to the small number of §1983 cases brought before Monroe, by 1977 over 20,000 §1983 suits 
were filed per year.”); Randolph Haines, Reputation, Stigma, and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. 
Davis, 30 STAN. L. REV. 191, 191 (1977) (explaining that the “landmark” decision in Monroe increased 
the number of 1983 suits).    
 51. See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants: A Study in 
Section 1983 Procedure, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 823 (2003) (noting section 1983’s “uniquely 
complicated (one might say Byzantine) liability scheme”).  
 52. Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 44, at 1502. 
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committed by their officers,53 and (2) qualified immunity—a defense 
that allows a defendant to avoid § 1983 liability if the defendant’s 
conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable 
officer would have known.54 This Part of this Article gives an overview 
of the origins of each of doctrine and argues which particular rules 
should be changed.  It then traces the two doctrines’ joint development 
and interaction with each other since roughly 1980.  Finally, it 
concludes by presenting some of the critiques of each doctrine as well as 
how the two interact, as a background for the changes proposed in Part 
II.  
A. Municipal Liability—No Respondeat Superior for Cities, Plaintiffs 
Must Establish Municipal Liability by Showing Link to Policy or Custom 
While Monroe v. Pape opened the door to more § 1983 suits against 
individual officers, it closed the door to suits against cities—holding that 
cities (in that case, the City of Chicago) were not suable “persons” under 
§ 1983.55  The Court based its holding on its reading of the legislative 
history of § 1983.  In particular, it argued that the rejection by Congress 
of a proposed amendment known as the Sherman Amendment showed 
that Congress did not intend for the statute to impose liability on cities 
for their officers’ violation of citizens’ constitutional rights.56  
But Monroe’s rejection of municipal liability under §1983 lasted only 
about a decade. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Court 
reversed Monroe on this point, holding that municipal government 
entities can be held liable for the constitutional torts committed by their 
officials.57 The Court limited its holding, however, by refraining from 
imposing blanket respondeat superior liability on cities for their 
officers’ constitutional torts.58  Instead, the Court required that the 
violation by the individual officer be tied to a “policy” or “custom” of a 
municipal government entity.59   
The Court sourced this “policy or custom” requirement in the 
language of the statute, which imposes liability on a defendant who 
“subjects, or causes [the plaintiff] to be subjected” to a violation of 
 
 53. See, e.g., Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (holding 
that municipal defendants can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983). 
 54. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (establishing an objective test for 
assessing qualified immunity).   
 55. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).   
 56. Id. at 188-91.   
 57. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978).  
 58. Id. at 695.  
 59. Id. at  694. 
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federal rights.60 The Court reasoned that the word “cause” must mean 
something more than mere “but-for” causation.61  The Court also 
revisited the legislative history it had consulted in Monroe, concluding 
that that legislative history, including the rejection of the Sherman 
Amendment, did not show an intent to make municipal defendants 
completely free of liability.  Rather, it showed that Congress did not 
intend to impose strict municipal liability on cities.62 
As discussed shortly, the Court would end up spending a great deal of 
time and energy explaining and expounding on what must be shown to 
establish a policy or custom.63 But the basic idea of Monell was that 
municipal defendants should only be held liable when that defendant 
itself was causally responsible and at fault for the constitutional 
violation committed by their individual officers.64  This type of liability 
has been called and is sometimes referred to in this Article as “Monell 
liability” or the “Monell doctrine.”65 Later cases also made clear that a 
municipal defendant cannot be liable unless some individual officer is 
found to have violated the constitution; that is, there is no such thing as 
a violation for which a city can be held responsible that is not 
attributable to the actions of some individual officer.66  This  means that 
in any viable § 1983 suit against a municipal defendant there will always 
be some officer whose qualified immunity defense the city will be able, 
under this Article’s  proposal, to invoke.   
B. Qualified Immunity—Individual Officers Get It But Municipal 
Defendants Don’t. 
The evolution in the doctrine of municipal liability proceeded along a 
parallel track with the Court’s development of the doctrine of qualified 
immunity, which is the primary substantive defense to liability available 
to individual defendants under §1983. After Monroe, § 1983 exposed 
defendant officers to money damages imposed personally against 
 
 60. 42 U.S.C. §1983. 
 61. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. 
 62. Id. at 664. 
 63. See infra Part II.C.1.  
 64. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95.  
 65. See, e.g., McMillian v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 805, (1997) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Valentino v. Vill. Of S. Chicago Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir.. 2009); Karen M. 
Blum, Making out the Monell Claim under Section 1983, 25 TOURO L. REV. 829 (2012); David Jacks 
Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the  Debate 
Over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2187 (2005) [hereinafter Achtenberg, Taking 
History Seriously].   
 66. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (local government cannot be held 
liable if the plaintiff has “suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer”). 
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them.67 Concerns about imposing personal liability on government 
officers and changes in the Court’s composition then led the Court to 
develop immunity doctrines to protect officers.68 
Specifically, the Court has developed two immunity defenses to limit 
the liability of individual officers sued under §1983—qualified 
immunity and absolute immunity.69 This Article is primarily concerned 
with qualified immunity, which is explained at more length shortly. 
Absolute immunity provides total immunity from suit under § 1983 to 
government officers performing legislative,70 judicial,71 and 
prosecutorial72 functions, no matter how blatantly unconstitutional their 
actions.73 In interpreting the contours of absolute immunity, as in other 
aspects of interpreting § 1983, the Court has looked for guidance to 
common law, both as it stood in 187174 and also as it developed 
thereafter.75 
Officers not entitled to absolute immunity may assert qualified 
immunity, a more limited defense that allows an officer to escape 
liability when the officer can establish that her conduct did not violate 
clearly established laws of which a reasonable officer would have 
known.76 Although qualified immunity is less than absolute, it is still 
quite robust, protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.” 77 Further, the trend of the Court over time 
has been towards strengthening the defense, both substantively and by 
giving qualified immunity cases a special precedence on the Court’s 
docket.78 
 
 67. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978). In most cases, however, officers are 
indemnified for that liability by their government employers. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police 
Indemnification, supra note 23, at 911-913 (describing empirical study concluding that essentially all 
§1983 judgment and settlement dollars are paid by governments, not officers).  
 68. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, (1974); Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 
13, at 244;  cf. Christopher E. Smith, The Impact of New Justices: The U.S. Supreme Court and 
Criminal Justice Policy, 30 AKRON L. REV. 55, 65 (1996) (describing how the Court’s changing 
composition leads to doctrinal changes). 
 69. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (noting and describing the difference 
between the two types of immunity) 
 70. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).  
 71. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). 
 72. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).  
 73. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (holding that a judge was entitled to 
absolute immunity even though judge ordered unconsented sterilization of a minor).  
 74. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389 (2012) (stating that the Court begins by looking to “the 
common law as it existed when Congress passed §1983” in 1871).  
 75. See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363 (2012); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 
(1997); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980).  
 76. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).   
 77. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).  
 78. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 16, at 41-42; Kinports, supra note 42, at 63-64; Alan K. Chen, 
The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L. J. 229, 273-75 (2006) (arguing that Rehnquist and 
13
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The qualified immunity doctrine initially developed as a good-faith 
defense to the imposition of liability under §1983.  Under the early 
doctrine, an officer could avert liability under the statute by showing 
that she acted with “good faith and probable cause” in engaging in the 
allegedly unconstitutional conduct.79  
It was this version of the doctrine that the Court considered in Owen 
v. City of Independence,80 which held that cities may not assert the same 
defense of qualified immunity that is available to individual officers. 
The Court based its decision in part on an examination of common-law 
immunities, which were the original source of the qualified immunity 
defense, and its conclusion that municipal governments were not entitled 
to such immunity under common law.81 The Court also based its 
decision on the majority’s sense that social principles of cost-sharing 
argued against leaving plaintiffs empty handed, even when the violation 
of the plaintiffs’ rights was not clearly established at the time of the 
harm.82  
The result of Owen, together with the Court’s holding in Monell, is 
that cities can only be held liable when an officer’s violation of a 
plaintiff’s rights has been shown to be the result of a municipal policy or 
custom;83 but if the violation can be shown to be caused by policy or 
custom, the city will be strictly liable for it regardless of whether a 
reasonable officer at the time of the conduct would or should have 
known that the conduct was a violation of the constitution under clearly 
established law.84  
C. Doctrinal Development of Monell Liability and Qualified Immunity—
Complexity and Constriction 
Monell, which created the current regime of municipal liability, and 
Owen, which declined to allow municipal defendants to assert qualified 
immunity, were both decided in span of two years.85 Since then, as 
explained in this Section, the Court has developed a complex framework 
of Monell liability rules and has made significant changes to the 
qualified immunity defense, both of which make recovery harder for 
plaintiffs. Understanding those developments gives the context for this 
Article’s proposal to change (and merge) the two doctrines.  
 
Roberts Courts are turning qualified immunity into an absolute immunity). 
 79. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). 
 80. 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980). 
 81. Id. at 644-48. 
 82. Id. at 657. 
 83. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. Of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).  
 84. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 85. Monell was decided June 6, 1978, and Owen was decided April 16, 1980.  
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1. Developments in Monell Liability 
Rejecting respondeat superior, Monell required plaintiffs seeking to 
recover against municipal defendants to show that their injury and the 
conduct of the individual officer who caused that injury were both the 
result of a municipal “policy” or “custom.”86  In later cases, the Court 
elaborated on this limit on municipal liability by developing a complex 
set of doctrines for assessing whether a plaintiff had shown the required 
policy or custom.87  The Court has provided four different “routes” to 
municipal liability: (1) official policy, (2) custom, (3) inadequate 
training, and (4) improper hiring. Each of those requires tracing a 
violation to conduct by high-ranking policymakers for the municipal 
defendant.88  
Easier cases involve an express, written municipal act or policy that 
itself is challenged as unconstitutional.  But most cases seeking to 
impose municipal liability under § 1983 are harder ones where the 
plaintiff must establish the requisite “policy or custom” by tying it to 
some decision by a high official, unofficial municipal custom, or pattern 
or practice of inadequate supervision or training of officers.89  The 
Court, over a series of cases, has developed rules for evaluating these 
paths to liability. 
The Court has held that a municipal defendant might be held liable 
based not only on its express policies, but also on unofficial customs.90  
Liability also can be imposed if the violation was ordered or directed by 
an official with authority to make policy for the city.91 Finally, liability 
can be imposed if the violation resulted from the city’s failure to train its 
officers to deal with situation that would be expected to recur as the 
 
 86. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.  
 87. See, e.g., Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-83 (1986) (recognizing 
municipal “policy” can be established by the actions or decisions of an officer who is a policymaker for 
the municipality); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989) (recognizing in limited 
circumstances Monell liability for failure to train); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 736 
(1989) (limiting municipal liability for employee violations under respondeat superior theory); City of 
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126-27 (1988) (clarifying rules on “policymaker” Monell 
liability); Bd. of Cty. Cmmrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997) (limiting municipal liability for hiring 
mistakes); McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997) (considering whether policymaker 
was making policy for immune State or suable County); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) 
(restricting failure-to-train liability for District Attorneys’ offices).  
 88. Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously, supra note 65, at 2188.  
 89. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 (distinguishing between easier and harder “policy and custom” 
cases under §1983).  
 90. See, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167 (1970) (recognizing liability 
based on informal but pervasive local or state custom); Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 
1226 (1982) (recognizing path to demonstrating liability by “informal acts or omissions of supervisory 
officials”). 
 91. Pembauer, 475 U.S. at 481-83; Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123.   
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officers performed their duties.92  The application of these rules has led 
to difficulties and to confusing, if not inconsistent, results. 93  Lower 
courts have to examine state law to decide whether certain officials are 
or are not “policymakers” with respect to a certain government 
function,94 and whether and when a practice amounts to a liability-
justifying “custom.”95  Meeting the Supreme Court’s tests requires 
plaintiffs to pursue discovery not only into the facts and events of the 
particular case, but more broadly into municipal documents and records 
relating to policy, custom, discipline, training, and other, similar 
incidents.96   
Along with the application and refinement of these subtle distinctions, 
and probably driving them, the trend in the Court has been to 
increasingly constrict municipal liability through the application of these 
demanding fault and causation requirements.97  The Court repeatedly 
emphasized that, since (as Monell held) 1983 liability must not be 
respondeat superior liability, it is necessary to carefully scrutinize cases 
to make sure the plaintiff establishes the requisite degree of fault on the 
part of the city, and that the city’s action (or inaction) was causally 
responsible for the actual violation complained of by the plaintiff.98    
The Court also emphasized that one important reason for its strict 
approach,99 as well as its resort to examining state law to resolve 
questions about which officials are policymakers and for which 
entities,100  is to respect the federal balance created by § 1983.101  The 
Court has said that, while § 1983 imposes liability on state and local 
officers for violating federal rights, that liability must be constrained and 
limited to prevent undue interference with the proper and efficient 
functioning of state and local government, and over-deterrence of local 
 
 92. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91; see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 417-18 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (summarizing three different paths to municipal liability recognized by the Court in its cases 
applying the Monell doctrine). 
 93. See, e.g., Brown, 520 U.S. at 431-36 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining the 
uncertainties and difficulties introduced by the doctrine).  
 94. See, e.g. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124 (holding courts must use state law to determine 
policymaking authority); see also McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786 (examining Alabama constitutional and 
statutory law to decide whether a particular policymaker was “state” or “local”).  
 95. See, e.g., Webster, 689 F.2d at 1225. 
 96. See, e.g., Futterman et al, Chicago’s Broken System, supra note 28, at 258-59;  Taylor, A 
Litigator’s View, supra note 22, at 763-70.  
 97. See., e.g., Connick, 563 U.S. at 64-67; Brown, 520 U.S. at 410.  
 98. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404-05; City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385. 
 99. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.  
 100. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 
124.  
 101. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392.  
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officials in the performance of their duties.102  
As others have observed, it seems plausible that much of this 
confusion and complication was introduced because of, or in reaction to, 
Owen.103 After Owen exposed cities to strict liability for constitutional 
violations, and the Court’s line-up became more conservative, the Court 
then corrected course by restricting municipal liability by making it 
harder104 (and harder105, and harder106) to show that particular violations 
were attributable to the municipality.107   
This Article suggests that the Court’s focus on refining (and 
complicating) municipal liability doctrine has been misguided, and the 
cause of a good deal of difficulty in the application of the law of §1983. 
As explained in Part II, a better solution to this problem is simply to 
make municipalities liable in respondeat superior for their officers’ 
torts, allowing the benefit of their officers’ qualified immunity defense.  
These changes will not only make litigation more efficient but will also 
better serve the interest in federalism that the Court’s Monell doctrine 
aims to advance.108  
2.  Developments in Qualified Immunity 
Since Owen denied municipal defendants the opportunity to invoke 
the qualified immunity defense, the Court has significantly refined the 
doctrine to make it more favorable to the individual defendants who are 
entitled to raise it.109  The first and seminal change was in Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald,110 which abandoned the subjective component of the 
qualified immunity test in favor of a purely objective analysis.111 The 
Court’s stated goal in making this change was to make the issue of 
qualified immunity easier to resolve at summary judgment, by removing 
from the case subjective questions of motivation that would tend to 
generate fact questions for the jury.112  
Next, in Anderson v. Creighton, the Court refined the defense by 
imposing a requirement: before an officer may be found to have violated 
 
 102. Id.; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).  
 103. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 233.  
 104. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389.  
 105. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. 
 106. Connick, 563 U.S. at 410. 
 107. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 233. 
 108. See, e.g., Brown, 520 U.S. at 415; City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392;  
 109. See, e.g., See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L. J. 229, 273-
75 (2006) (discussing the strengthening of qualified immunity under the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts). 
 110. 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982).   
 111. Id.   
 112. Id.  
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clearly established constitutional law, the constitutional violation must 
be defined with reference to the “appropriate level of generality.”113 
What this means, essentially, is that an officer can only be held liable, 
and the qualified immunity defense overcome, when at the time of the 
challenged conduct there were extant Supreme Court cases, or a 
consensus of circuit cases, that were sufficiently similar to the 
challenged conduct that it should have been clear to the officer that the 
conduct was unconstitutional.114 The Court has been vigorous and 
enthusiastic about policing lower court judgments for compliance with 
Anderson’s standard; it has decided several notable argued opinions 
reversing lower courts on those grounds,115 and it routinely issues 
summary reversal of circuit opinions for failure to properly apply 
Anderson.116  Finally, one additional major and more recent 
development in qualified immunity doctrine is Pearson v. Callahan’s 
holding that a district court considering the qualified immunity issue 
may choose to resolve the case based on the “clearly established” prong 
without first deciding whether there was a constitutional violation at 
all.117   
More broadly, uniting (and probably driving) all of these specific 
developments is a general trend towards making the qualified immunity 
defense more robust and defendant-friendly.118  The Court has been very 
active in granting cases to consider questions relating to qualified 
immunity,119 and almost always sides with defendant officers, holding 
that a particular constitutional violation was not “clearly established” at 
the time of the conduct.120 The Court has also been particularly vigorous 
about using summary reversals to police the circuits’ obedience to its 
qualified immunity doctrine.121  
 
 113. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 
 114. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009); Wilson v. Layne; 526 U.S. 603, 
615-17 (1999); Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 263-64 (criticizing this approach and 
arguing for replacing it with a focus on whether the conduct was “clearly unconstitutional”). 
 115. See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct 2012, 2023 (2014); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 243-44 (2009); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (each reversing denial of qualified 
immunity based on misapplication of Anderson’s “level of generality”).   
 116. See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548 (2017) (per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.Ct. 
305 (2015) (per curiam); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015) (per curiam); Carroll v. Carman, 135 
S.Ct. 348 (2014) (per curiam); Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3 (2013) (per curiam); see also Baude, supra 
note 16, at 41.  
 117. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239. 
 118. Baude, supra note 16, at 40-41; Kinports, supra note 42, at 63. 
 119. Baude, supra note 16, at 40. 
 120. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 16, at 47 (collecting the Court’s argued qualified immunity cases 
and noting that almost all have ruled in the defendant’s favor); Kinports, supra note 42, at 63 (noting 
that the Court has ruled for defendants in sixteen out of eighteen “clearly established” cases in the past 
fifteen years, and “has not ruled in favor of a §1983 defendant on this question in more than a decade.”).  
 121. Kinports, supra note 42, at 63 (noting that the Court has issued at least one summary reversal 
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3.  The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of § 1983 is Mainly Policy 
Driven 
In interpreting § 1983, the Court has mostly purported to rely on 
conventional122 sources of statutory interpretation, though it has also at 
times explicitly invoked  purpose and policy arguments.123  While the 
Court’s decisions mainly purport to be driven by text,124 legislative 
history,125 and reference to the common law of torts in 1871, 126 many 
commentators have observed that the Court’s choices seem to be 
actually driven mostly by policy127 and are unsupported (or, at least, not 
determined) by the conventional sources on which they purport to 
rely.128  There are many examples, but notable and particularly relevant 
is that various groups of justices have at times argued, each 
persuasively, that the legislative history of § 1983 forbids any municipal 
 
of a circuit court decision on qualified immunity in each of the last four years);  Baude, supra note 16, at 
4 (noting the Court’s special treatment of qualified immunity on its summary-reversal docket).   
 122. “Conventional” here is used to mean broadly “sources other than policy arguments.” Cf. 
Baude, supra note 16, at 2 (referring to reliance on these types of sources as “technical legal 
justification.”).   
 123. Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 490 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting, 
but questioning the relevance of, the Court’s consultation of “considerations of public policy” in 
interpreting §1983); Baude, supra note 16, at 2 (distinguishing between the two types of argument).  
 124. See, e.g., Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 688 (1978)  
 (analyzing meaning of “person” in statutory text). 
 125. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 188-91 (1961); Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-90 (each 
analyzing legislative history to determine whether and to what extent drafters of section 1983 intended 
to impose liability on municipalities).     
 126. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389 (2012) (noting that the Court looks to common 
law to interpret section 1983);  Baude, supra note 16, at 7 (noting that the Court claims to interpret the 
statute in light of the historical common law as of 1871, and not based on the modern evolution of tort 
law); but see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (justifying court’s rejection of 
qualified immunity for municipal defendants by analogy with the development of modern strict liability 
doctrines in tort law). 
 127. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade (O’ Connor, J) (arguing that Court should consult policy when 
common-law sources run out); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 844 (1985), (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Court’s holding can be justified only based on policy concerns about municipal 
bankruptcies); Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 791-92 (7th Cir.. 2014) (Posner, J) 
(arguing that Monell doctrine is best understood  “as simply having crafted a compromise rule that 
protect the budgets of local governments from automatic liability for their employees’ wrongs, driven by 
a concern about public budgets and the potential extent of taxpayer liability”); John M. Greabe, A Better 
Path for Constitutional Tort Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 205 (2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
openly acknowledged its willingness to rewrite the text of section 1983 to create a regime that ‘better’ 
balances competing policy considerations than does the actual law that Congress passed.”); Jack M. 
Beermann, Common Law Elements of the Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 695, 698 (1997) 
(“Overall, the Court’s methodology . . . has been highly oriented toward legislative intent and policy, 
with the common law playing an important role.”). 
 128. See Baude, supra note 16, at 7-17 (arguing that the Court’s interpretation of the statute with 
respect to qualified immunity cannot actually be justified by the historical, common law sources on 
which the Court purports to rely).  
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liability,129 that it allows municipal liability but only when the violation 
was caused by municipal policy or custom,130 or that it requires full 
respondeat superior liability for municipalities.131  
Some Justices themselves have at times have seemed to acknowledge 
that policy choices, rather than more conventional methods of statutory 
interpretation, drive the doctrine in this area of law. Often, dissenting 
Justices have leveled this criticism against the majority.132 Justice 
O’Connor called for openly admitting that, at least sometimes, the Court 
has to make policy choices about what doctrine best serves the purposes 
of the statute, rather than pretending the rules are driven by delving into 
19th century common law.133 Justice Thomas, on the other hand, 
recently “called out” the Court for failing to ground its development of 
the doctrine in sound and well-researched investigation into the common 
law as of 1871.134  Beyond the Supreme Court, Judge Posner has made a 
similar observation about the Monell doctrine, noting that it “is best 
understood” not in terms of the text or legislative history of the statute, 
but instead “as simply having crafted a compromise rule that protect the 
budgets of local governments from automatic liability for their 
employees’ wrongs, driven by a concern about public budgets and the 
potential extent of taxpayer liability.”135 
Thus, in interpreting § 1983, the Court’s doctrinal choices are to some 
degree constrained by the conventional interpretive sources but only 
broadly so.  For this reason, this Article focuses mainly on policy 
arguments in favor of its proposal, and only later (and briefly) argues 
that the proposed changes can indeed by justified by reference to the 
statute’s text, history, and common-law background.136  Further, the fact 
that the Court’s interpretation of § 1983 is mostly policy-driven supports 
the Article’s concluding argument that the Supreme Court might 
actually make the proposed changes given that the policy arguments are 
appealing, and the changes are not plainly foreclosed by conventional 
 
 129. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); see also  Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New 
York, 436 U.S. 658, 719-725 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 130. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.  
 131. Bd. of Cty. Cmmrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 434-37 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Tuttle, 
471 U.S. at 836-39 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 132. See, e.g., Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 844-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Owen v. City of Independence, 
445 U.S. 622, 670 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 133. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Once it is established 
that the common law of 1871 provides us with no real guidance on this question, we should turn to the 
policies underlying §1983 to determine which rule best accords with those policies.”). 
 134. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1870-71 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment) (arguing that the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence has deviated from 
applying common law precedents into an quasi-legislative exercise in balancing policy interests). 
 135. Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 136. See infra Part II. 
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interpretive sources.137 
D. Critiques of the Doctrinal Status Quo 
1.  Broader Context: Debates Over “21st Century Policing” 
While not central to this Article’s specific doctrinal arguments, it is 
worth briefly noting the current context of intensive attention to and 
critiques of police use of force, racial inequities in policing, and whether 
local governments currently are doing well at striking the right balance 
between robust, effective policing and intrusive, rights-violating over 
policing.138 High-profile police shootings and uses of force, in particular 
against African-American men,139 as well as instances of retaliation and 
assassinations of police,140 have led to robust public scrutiny and debate 
about police uses of force.  
In the policing context, constitutional tort liability for officers and 
municipalities can be seen as a sort of backup mechanism for improving 
policing, and this Article’s arguments can be understood in the context 
of the current focus on policing as an argument for making that 
mechanism more effective.141 This Article argues that its proposed 
changes to municipal liability under § 1983 will improve cities’ 
incentives to supervise and train their officers to prevent constitutional 
 
 137. See infra Part III.    
 138. See, e.g., Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 811, 840 (2017); Symposium on The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing:  
Procedural Justice, Policing and Public Health,  40 SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL 
415 (2016) (collecting remarks and papers related to report of presidential task force); Julian A. Cook, 
III, Police Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of the President's Task Force’s Final Report, 
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 106, 107 (2016). 
 139. See, e.g., Haeyoun Park and Jasmine C. Lee, “Looking for Accountability in Police-Involved 
Shootings of Blacks,” N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2017, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/07/12/us/looking-for-accountability-in-police-involved-
deaths-of-blacks.html (noting that these cases “have fueled outrage, heightened racial tensions and 
instigated protests around the nation.”). 
 140. See National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, Preliminary 2016 Law 
Enforcement Officer Fatalities Report, available at 
http://www.nleomf.org/assets/pdfs/reports/Preliminary-2016-EOY-Officer-Fatalities-Report.pdf (last 
visited July 19, 2017) (noting spikes in 2016 of number of officers fatally shot, as well as ambush 
shootings and multiple-fatality shootings).  
 141. Cf. Lindsay de Stefan, “No Man Is Above the Law and No Man Is Below It:” How Qualified 
Immunity Reform Could Create Accountability and Curb Widespread Police Misconduct, 47 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 543, 543-545 (2016) (situating arguments for changes to qualified immunity doctrine in 
context of current focus on police violence); but see Joanna Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of 
Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1040 
(2010); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000) (each questioning whether and how constitutional 
tort liability effectively imposes deterrence on municipal defendants). 
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violations,142 which, in the context of policing, would mean 
incentivizing cities to do a better job training and regulating how their 
officers use force and respect constitutional rights in their interactions 
with citizens.  
2.  Critiques of Monell Doctrine 
The Monell doctrine has drawn significant criticism and critique by 
both jurists and scholars.  Justice Stevens was long a critic of Monell’s 
rejection of respondeat superior liability in favor of the “policy or 
custom” rule.143 He argued that text, legislative history, common law, 
and policy all supported the imposition of respondeat superior liability 
on municipal defendants.144   Justice Breyer, in Board of County 
Commissioners v. Brown, in a dissent joined by three other justices, 
added to Justice Stevens’ critique by arguing that the Court’s Monell 
doctrine, in addition to having shaky foundations, had become too 
confusing and complicated to apply.145 He noted that the Monell “policy 
or custom” limit on municipal liability “has produced a highly complex 
body of interpretive law.”146  He argued for eliminating that limitation 
because the “soundness of the original principle [of limiting liability 
based on “policy or custom”] is doubtful,” and has led to the 
development of “a body of interpretive law that is so complex that the 
law has become difficult to apply.”147   
Scholars, too, have frequently criticized the Monell doctrine as overly 
complicated and difficult to apply.148  They have also argued that the 
Monell doctrine is too unforgiving because it makes it unnecessarily 
hard for plaintiffs to recover against municipal defendants.149 For a time 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, some commentators thought, based on 
the four dissenting votes in Brown, that the Court might be on the verge 
of eliminating Monell liability in favor of respondeat superior.150  The 
promise failed to materialize, however. Instead, the Court reaffirmed 
 
 142. See infra Part II.B.  
 143. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834-844 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Pembauer v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 489-491 (1986) (Stevens J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
 144. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 835-844. 
 145. Bd. of Cty. Cmmrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 434-37 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 146. Id. at 430. 
 147. Id. at 431.   
 148. See, e.g., Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 233-36.  
 149. See, e.g., Blum, The Maze, supra note 13 at 962-63; Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously, 
supra note 65, at 2191 (arguing that the “idiosyncratic stinginess” of Monell doctrine “confines entity 
liability in a manner that is unique to § 1983 and exists in no other area of the law”). 
 150. See, e.g., Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously, supra note 65, at 2184 (“The Monell 
doctrine . . . hangs by a thread”). 
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and made stricter the rules for failure-to-train liability in Connick v. 
Thompson, though only by a 5-4 vote, 151  and to widespread 
condemnation from scholarly commentators.152 Since then, the Court 
has shown no inclination to retreat from its adherence to the Monell 
doctrine, but neither has it displayed nearly the same enthusiasm for that 
doctrine as it has done for qualified immunity, as to which it has granted 
more cases, and decided almost all of them for defendants, often by 
unanimous or supermajority votes.153 
Nonetheless, many scholars have argued and continue to argue that 
the right solution is to reverse Monell’s halfway holding and impose 
strict respondeat superior on municipal defendants. In 2015, for 
example, Karen Blum informally “polled” several experts to ask what 
single change to the doctrine would do the most to “fix” the law of § 
1983.154  The most common response, and the one with which she 
agreed, was to adopt respondeat superior liability for municipal 
defendants.155  In contrast, there are currently no voices calling for 
“fixing” municipal liability by reviving Monroe’s holding that municipal 
defendants are not “persons” under § 1983.156  
As for defenders of the current Monell doctrine beyond the Supreme 
Court, Judge Posner has offered a sort of defense, or at least a 
rationalization, of the doctrine.157  He argues that Monell’s “policy or 
custom” doctrine “is best understood” not in terms of the text or 
legislative history of the statute, but instead “as simply having crafted a 
compromise rule that protect the budgets of local governments from 
automatic liability for their employees’ wrongs, driven by a concern 
about public budgets and the potential extent of taxpayer liability.”158  
3.  Critiques of Qualified Immunity 
Qualified immunity doctrine has also been heavily criticized. One 
fairly common criticism is that the qualified immunity doctrine (like the 
 
 151. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (holding that to prevail in a failure-to-train 
case, a plaintiff will generally need to plead and prove a pattern of other, similar violations that were 
already known to the municipal defendant).  
 152. See, e.g., Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 409, 436-37 (2016).  
 153. See, e.g. Baude, supra note 16, at 41-42; (noting privileged place of qualified immunity on 
Court’s docket). 
 154. Blum, The Maze, supra note 13, at 962-63.  
 155. Id.  
 156. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 238 
(noting that this would be one possible way to align municipal liability with state governments’ 
complete immunity from section 1983 suits).  
 157. Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.). 
 158. Id.  
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municipal liability doctrine) is too complicated and difficult to apply.159  
Another major line of criticism by many commentators,160 as well as by 
Justice Sotomayor more recently,161 is that the defense is too favorable 
to officers and unfriendly to plaintiffs. In addition, many scholars also 
have criticized the Court’s development of the doctrine as inconsistent162 
or disingenuous, in the sense that it is driven ultimately by policy 
considerations, rather than the interpretive sources the Court purports to 
rely on: text, legislative history, and common law.163  In that vein, most 
recently, Will Baude argued that the entire doctrine cannot be justified at 
all based on historical and doctrinal sources of statutory 
interpretation.164 
However, with the recent and partial exceptions of Justice Sotomayor 
and Justice Thomas,165 the Court seems mostly uninterested in these 
criticisms of its qualified immunity doctrine. While the Court’s cases 
expounding municipal-liability doctrine consistently draw or drew 
dissents from 4 justices,166 or even failed to generate majority opinions 
at all,167 its qualified immunity cases often draw fewer168 or no 
dissenters.169   Further, the Court regularly and unanimously reverses 
 
 159. Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the Qualified-
immunity defense,” 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447 (2000) (“Wading through the doctrine of 
qualified immunity is one of the most morally and conceptually challenging tasks federal appellate court 
judges routinely face.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Kinports, supra note 42, at 64 (2016) (arguing that “the Court has engaged in a 
pattern of covertly broadening the defense, describing it in increasingly generous terms . . . .”); Barbara 
E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 664-65 (1998) (arguing 
that the doctrine does too much to protect officers). 
 161. Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1278 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
 162. See, e.g., Michael Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 
MISS. L.J. 157 (1998) (arguing that Court has been inconsistent in its reliance on and application of 
common law rules). 
 163. See, e.g., John M. Greabe, A Better Path for Constitutional Tort Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 
189, 205 (2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has openly acknowledged its willingness to rewrite the text of 
section 1983 to create a regime that ‘better’ balances competing policy considerations than does the 
actual law that Congress passed.”). 
 164. Baude, supra note 16, at 7-17. 
 165. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1870 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (noting the Justice’s “growing concern with our qualified immunity jurisprudence”). 
 166. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 79 (2011); Bd. of Cty. Cmmrs v. Brown, 520 
U.S. 397, 416 (1997).  
 167. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 114 (1988) (plurality opinion of 
O’Connor, J.); Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 470 (1986) (partial majority and partial 
plurality opinion). 
 168. See. e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 389 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting alone) 
 169. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S.Ct. 1539 (2017); Lane v. Franks, 134 
U.S. 2369 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012 (2014); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 245 
(2009) (each unanimously ruling in favor of the defendant on an issue related to qualified immunity). 
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circuit courts for misapplying its qualified immunity doctrine,170 while it 
rarely has done the same thing for misapplication of Monell liability.  In 
short, the Court seems quite enthusiastic and unhesitant to apply and 
broaden qualified immunity.171  
While many academics have criticized the content of qualified 
immunity doctrine, far fewer voices have criticized Owen’s holding that 
municipal governments should not be allowed to assert the defense.  The 
most notable proponent of that view is John Jeffries, who has argued 
against the Owen rule on the ground that Owen’s adoption of strict 
liability for municipalities wrongly divorces § 1983 liability from a 
grounding in fault.172 Professor Jeffries also argued that strict municipal 
liability should be eliminated in favor of a liability scheme in which (a 
modified form of) the qualified immunity defense is the sole liability 
rule under § 1983.173  The next section considers Professor Jeffries’ 
proposal in detail, as the springboard for this Article’s central argument.      
 4.  Jeffries’ Proposal: One Liability Rule Based on Modified 
Qualified Immunity  
Building on earlier work arguing that liability under § 1983 should be 
fault-based,174 and on arguments about the right-remedy gap in 
constitutional litigation,175 in 2013 John Jeffries argued for reworking § 
1983 liability based on a “unified theory” of constitutional torts.176  He 
proposed eliminating both absolute immunity and strict municipal 
liability; substituting as the sole liability rule a reworked version of the 
qualified immunity defense. Under this reformulation of qualified 
immunity, the relevant question would be whether the defendant’s 
 
 170. See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548 (2017) (per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.Ct. 
305 (2015) (per curiam); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015) (per curiam); Carroll v. Carman, 135 
S.Ct. 348 (2014) (per curiam ); Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 134 S.Ct. 3 (2013) (per curiam);  Scott 
Michelman, Taylor v. Barkes: Summary reversal is part of a qualified immunity trend, SCOTUSblog 
(Jun. 2, 2015, 11:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/taylor-v-barkes-summary-reversal-is-
part-of-a-qualified-immunity-trend/. 
 171. See Baude, supra note 16, at 41-42; Kinports, supra note 42, at 69 (each noting, and 
criticizing, the Court’s enthusiasm).  
 172. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 
47, 68-71 (1998); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation For Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the 
Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 89 (1989).  
 173. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 258-64, 270.  
 174. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 
47, 68-70 (1998); John C. Jeffries, Compensation For Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the 
Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 89 (1989). 
 175. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 87-88 
(1999). 
 176. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA L. REV. 207, 209, 
259 (2013). 
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conduct was “clearly unconstitutional,” rather whether rights were 
“clearly established.”177  In support of his argument for eliminating strict 
municipal liability, Jeffries noted the wastefulness of litigating “policy 
and custom,”178 concerns about over-deterring municipal officials into 
inaction,179 and the desirability of maintaining a right-remedy gap in 
constitutional litigation in order to further the development of and 
innovation in constitutional law.180  While arguing that qualified 
immunity “should be the rule,” and for redefining the qualified 
immunity standard, Jeffries also seemed to argue that this would require, 
or at least should lead to, eliminating direct liability for municipal 
defendants.181 
This Article’s proposal builds on Jeffries’ arguments, and agrees with 
them in that it argues for eliminating strict municipal liability, and that 
qualified immunity should be the main basis of liability in § 1983 
suits.182 However, it differs from Jeffries’ arguments in that it argues for 
imposing respondeat superior liability on municipal defendants while 
making municipal qualified immunity depend on the qualified immunity 
of the individual officer.  Thus, it draws on not only on Jeffries’ 
proposal for eliminating strict municipal liability and making qualified 
immunity “the” liability rule,183 but also on the chorus of scholars who 
have argued for municipal respondeat superior liability, disagreeing 
with the latter group on the point that municipal liability should be based 
on qualified immunity and not strict liability.184  This Article now turns 
to explaining and offering policy justifications for the proposal, and 
after that to arguing that the proposed changes in addition to being 
theoretically sound are also possible and feasible.185   
 
 177. Id. at 246, 264, 270.  
 178. Id. at 234. 
 179. Id. at 243-46. 
 180. Id. at 246-50. 
 181. Id. at 240 (“[T]he zone of strict liability defined by Monell and Owen could be eliminated in 
favor of governmental immunity from direct liability.”); see also id. at 270 (“I would therefore eliminate 
the pocket of strict liability that exists in current law.”).  
 182. Id. at 249, 270. 
 183. Id. at 270. 
 184. See, e.g, Blum, The Maze, supra note 13, at 962-63. 
 185. See infra Part III.B. 
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II.  PROPOSAL AND POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS:  MAKE CITIES LIABLE IN 
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR BUT LET THEM ASSERT THEIR OFFICERS’ 
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE 
A. Proposal and Summary of Policy Justifications 
The law governing cities’ liability under §1983 should be changed so 
that cities are subjected to respondeat superior liability but are allowed 
to assert the same qualified immunity defense available to their officers 
whose actions are the basis for the suit. The first change would reverse 
Monell and eliminate its “policy and custom” requirement for municipal 
liability,186 along with the doctrines relating to custom, policymaking, 
training, and hiring that have grown out of that holding.187 The second 
change would reverse Owen’s holding that cities have no qualified 
immunity188 and allow them the benefit of the qualified immunity 
defense available to their officers.  The proposal is not that cities be 
entitled to assert their “own” qualified immunity defense; instead, cities’ 
liability would turn on whether the individual officers whose conduct 
allegedly the violated plaintiff’s rights are entitled to qualified 
immunity.189  
The rest of this Part offers policy arguments in favor of this proposal.  
First, the change would make § 1983 litigation significantly simpler and 
more efficient by eliminating the unwieldy, confusing, and largely 
meaningless (because of indemnification) sideshow of “policy and 
custom” municipal liability doctrine, and by focusing the litigation 
mainly on the question whether individual officers’ conduct violated 
clearly established constitutional law. It will also improve judicial 
efficiency by allowing federal courts adjudicating § 1983 cases to focus 
more on questions of federal constitutional law, which are within their 
area of competence, rather than questions of state and local government 
law, which are less so.   
In addition to improving efficiency, the proposed changes will also 
serve the statute’s primary goals of deterrence and compensation190 by 
improving the incentives for municipalities created by § 1983’s liability 
scheme without exposing them to massive new respondeat superior 
 
 186. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). 
 187. See supra Part I.C.1.  
 188. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980). 
 189. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (requiring that some individual 
officer must have violated the plaintiff’s rights before local government can be held liable). 
 190. Mark R. Brown, The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen?, 79 IOWA 
L. REV. 273, 289 (1994) (“The primary objectives behind section 1983 are deterrence and 
compensation.”). 
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liability.191   The combination of the changes proposed by this Article 
would improve deterrence for local governments by aligning their 
liability with the category of violations that they would actually be able 
to predict and prevent—ones that violate clearly established law at the 
time of the conduct in question.192 While cities will no longer be liable 
for violations they could not foresee, they will now be liable for any 
violation of clearly established law. Cities and policymakers would, 
therefore, no longer have the “know nothing” incentive imparted by the 
current doctrine, under which a city can only be liable if the plaintiff can 
tie a specific violation to an official policy or pervasive custom for 
which the city should be deemed responsible.  This will give cities 
stronger incentives to detect and prevent officers’ violations of clearly 
established law through better training, as well as internal investigation 
and reporting.  Further, these improvements can be made without 
massively expanding municipal liability. The rule against respondeat 
superior was created to stave off holding municipalities liable for all of 
their officers’ constitutional torts;193 however, empirical studies show 
that municipalities in fact tend to indemnify their officers for those 
torts.194 Thus, imposing respondeat superior would not greatly increase 
their liability.  
Third, the change would further the statute’s goal of compensation195 
by making it easier for more deserving plaintiffs to recover against 
cities, while also making it harder for less deserving plaintiffs to do so. 
Deserving plaintiffs will no longer have to plead and prove complicated 
assertions about municipal policy, custom, or practice in order to 
recover against cities, which will mean that plaintiffs’ claims against 
municipal defendants will be more likely to satisfy the Twombly/ Iqbal 
plausibility standard for pleading.196 At the same time, the change will 
remove the narrow category of “strict liability” for local governments,197 
in which plaintiffs are arguably the least deserving of recovery, because 
they receive a windfall from the city’s failure to anticipate a change in 
constitutional law.198  Liability will be focused on violations where the 
individual officers’ conduct violated clearly established law, and in 
those situations plaintiffs will be assured of recovery not only against 
 
 191. See, e.g.,  Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(Posner, J). 
 192. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at  244-46.  
 193. See, e.g.,  Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 844 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 194. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 23, at 911-13. 
 195. Brown, supra note 190, at 289. 
 196. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 197. John C. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 249 (referring to the rule of strict 
liability for municipalities as a small “pocket”). 
 198. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 669 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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the officer but also against the municipal defendant, eliminating the 
(small, but real) risk that the plaintiff will be unable to collect.  
Finally, the change would better serve the statutory value of 
federalism, which the Court has repeatedly said is a major consideration 
in its development of liability doctrine, and in particular the Monell 
doctrine, under § 1983.199  The changes will provide local governments 
with the flexibility to choose their own policies and strategies to prevent 
and deter violations of constitutional law by their officers, but will hold 
them strictly accountable when they fail to prevent violations of clearly-
established law.  Federal courts will no longer be in the business of 
examining and second-guessing municipal policies, customs, and 
training, or each state’s peculiar structure of government.   
B. Make § 1983 Litigation Simpler and More Efficient 
The proposed changes would simplify and increase the efficiency of § 
1983 litigation by eliminating the complex and costly inquiries into 
municipal policy, custom, government structure, training, and hiring that 
are required under current doctrine in order for a plaintiff to impose 
liability on a city in a lawsuit under §1983.200  
In developing doctrine under § 1983, the Court has sought rules that 
make litigation more efficient, both for efficiency’s sake and to ensure 
that issues of officer and government liability can be resolved earlier 
rather than later in the litigation.  In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, for example, 
the Court changed the qualified immunity test from a mixed 
subjective/objective test to a purely objective test so that the defense 
could be resolved more easily, and earlier, in the litigation.201 In 
Pearson v. Callahan, the Court reversed its earlier decision in Saucier v. 
Katz and held that district courts may decide whether the law was 
clearly established without having to first decide whether the conduct 
amounted to a constitutional violation, mainly for the reason that the 
new approach was more efficient and gave district courts more 
flexibility than Saucier’s “rigid” two-step approach.202  The changes 
proposed by this Article would serve this interest in efficiency by 
eliminating the convoluted and wasteful inquiry into municipal policy 
and custom.  
 
 199. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). 
 200. See, e.g., Bd. of Cty. Cmmrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 434-37 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 233-236 (criticizing the wastefulness of litigating policy 
and custom under Monell);  Taylor, supra note 22, at 760-765 (describing what plaintiff’s attorneys 
must do to develop such evidence).  
 201. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).   
 202. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 240-42 (2009) (reversing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 
201 (2001)). 
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As discussed above, the doctrine on municipal liability is complex 
and difficult to apply, as both judges and scholars have observed and 
argued.203 It can require a plaintiff to investigate and second-guess a 
city’s training regime in an attempt to show that defective training 
caused an individual officer to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional 
rights, and that the city was at fault for the failure to train.204  It can 
require complicated and subtle inquiries into whether a particular 
official, who gave an order or approval to “line” officers to engage in 
allegedly unconstitutional conduct, was in fact a “policymaker” for the 
city or not.205 Further, because the Court has held that the “policymaker” 
question is a matter of state, not federal law, the doctrine requires 
litigants and federal courts to argue and investigate the fine points of a 
particular state’s delegation of powers and authorities to local 
officials,206 including whether a particular “policymaker” makes policy 
for the State or the locality when that policymaker acts.207 
The “policy and custom” requirement, as developed by the court, can 
require plaintiffs to have to assemble a dossier of other examples of 
similar violations in order to provide support for either a “custom” or a 
“training” municipal liability claim.208 Further, plaintiffs can get caught 
in a trap for the unwary if they fail to identify other, similar examples of 
violations, even when the violation in their particular case was willful 
and clearly in violation of established constitutional law.209 
The discovery involved becomes more far reaching for both parties 
than the particular case at issue, because the current doctrine requires the 
plaintiff to indict the broader practices of the municipal entity in order to 
have a hope of holding that entity liable in the lawsuit.210 This means a 
plaintiff must, in crafting a complaint, make sufficient allegations about 
the city’s policies, customs, and practices to support liability under 
 
 203. See, e.g., Brown, 520 U.S. at 434-37 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 204. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). 
 205. See, e.g., Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986); City of St. Louis v. 
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1989). 
 206. See, e.g., Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124-25; Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 736-
37 (1989). 
 207. See, e.g., McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997). 
 208. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 22, at 756-57 (giving examples of the sort of evidence plaintiffs 
must present to hold a municipal defendant liable under the Monell doctrine).  
 209. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61, 72 (holding that multimillion dollar verdict in 
favor of plaintiff, who was victim of deliberate evidence suppression by prosecutors, against New 
Orleans District Attorney must be reversed because plaintiff had failed to identify a pattern of similar 
instances of violations in the office); see also id. at 108 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (suggesting that if 
plaintiffs had known about the requirement to prove a pattern, they could have identified evidence of 
several other, similar violations sufficient to do so).  
 210. See, e.g., Futterman at al., supra note 28, at 255-57 (describing one set of litigators’ efforts to 
gather evidence to systemically challenge Chicago policies). 
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current municipality rules,211 at risk of having the claims dismissed if 
plaintiff fails to do so.212  To prevail, the plaintiff must then seek 
discovery from the municipal defendant on each of these points.213 The 
municipality, for its part, must respond to those requests and in each 
case produce documents and information relating to its policies and 
informal practices, as well as all similar such cases for a period of 
years.214  If the case involves questions about municipal policy, training, 
or policymaking, executive officials may well have to be deposed or 
even testify in court about these matters, distracting them from their 
duties.215 If, on the other hand, the focus is limited to whether the 
individual officer’s conduct violated clearly established law of which a 
reasonable officer would have known, the scope of discovery and 
evidence will be much more limited. In addition to the intrusion of the 
requests themselves, removing the need to litigate “policy and custom” 
will also reduce the expenditure of attorney time on both sides of the 
litigation.216  This will further mean that, in the meritorious case, the 
losing defendant city will not have to pay for the time plaintiffs’ 
attorneys spent pursuing “policy” and “custom” liability.217  
Even worse, all this effort is very often entirely wasted as a practical 
matter, because research shows that municipalities almost always will 
indemnify their individual officers if the individual officer is held 
liable.218 What this means is that the litigation about municipal policy 
and custom is essentially a complex and wasteful sideshow in all cases 
except one narrow category: cases in which the municipalities policies 
and customs did cause the violation, but the violation was not clearly 
 
 211. See, e.g., McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011) (dismissing 
municipal liability claims for failure to meet Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard). 
 212. See, e.g., Saleem v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 2013 WL 5763206, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 
2013) (dismissing complaint for failure to provide “factual details regarding the existence, scope or 
application of the alleged School District policy, practice, procedure or custom of the School District”). 
 213. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 22, at 752-57 (providing practical advice to litigators on how to 
do this work).  
 214. See id. at 749 (discussing how defense lawyers’ strategies can increase litigation costs) the 
parties incentives to pour resources into litigating these issues); Surell Brady, Municipal Liability for 
Police Misconduct: Experiences in the Eighth Circuit, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81, 102 (1997) (“The 
law serves only to prolong what already are expensive suits. Litigation expenses can spiral out of 
control.”); Taylor, supra note 22, at 749 (“Monell claims can greatly increase the costs of litigation, the 
attorney time expended, the effort of the opposition, and the length and complexity of the trial.”). 
 215. See, e.g., Bishop v. Arcuri, 674 F.3d 456, 468 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing testimony of San 
Antonio police chief as “relevant law enforcement policymaker for the city” about San Antonio’s police 
practices in lawsuit challenging failure to “knock and announce” before executing drug search warrant).  
 216. See Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 233 (noting the parties incentives to pour 
resources into litigating these issues). 
 217. See 42 U.S.C. §1988 (allowing attorneys’ fees for “prevailing party” in civil-rights actions).   
 218. Schwartz, supra note 23, at 911-13. 
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established under the law extant at the time of the conduct.219 Because of 
that narrow window of opportunity for a strict-liability recovery under 
current doctrine, litigants will frequently devote considerable litigation 
resources to contesting policy and custom.220 For reasons explained 
below, that category of cases is one in which the municipality should not 
be liable any more than the individual officer. But the important point is 
that in almost all cases, the complicated and intrusive inquiry into 
municipal policy and custom is wasteful and unnecessary.  
Thus, as discussed, and as many jurists and commentators agree, 
eliminating Monell doctrine would improve efficiency in § 1983 
litigation.221  To support the proposal of this Article, then, it remains 
only to show that the other proposed change—extending the qualified 
immunity defense to municipal defendants—would not result in any 
increased complexity, time, or litigation expense. It would not because, 
under the change proposed by this Article, the municipal defendant 
would be liable in respondeat superior but entitled to the benefit of the 
officer’s qualified immunity defense.  Thus, the sole qualified-immunity 
question to be litigated would be whether the individual officers whose 
conduct was at issue are entitled to qualified immunity, an issue which 
would have been litigated anyway.222  Because this Article’s proposal is 
simply to let the city benefit from the officer’s qualified immunity 
defense and not to adopt a municipal qualified immunity rule that 
independently examines whether the city itself should have known about 
a violation of clearly established law,223 there will be no new issues to 
litigate. 
Finally, although somewhat speculatively, adopting this proposal 
could make § 1983 doctrine more efficient and simpler in another way: 
by eventually improving qualified immunity doctrine. If, as many have 
suggested, qualified immunity doctrine is overly complex,224 too unfair 
to plaintiffs,225 or focused on the wrong inquiry,226 the proposed change 
 
 219. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 633 (1980). 
 220. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 233. 
 221. See, e.g., Bd. of Cty. Cmmrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 434-37 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 222. Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477, 481 
(2011) (noting that “qualified immunity is very frequently asserted as a defense” in section 1983 suits).  
 223. Aside from being inefficient, it is hard to imagine a coherent inquiry into whether “a 
reasonable city” would have known about a violation of clearly established law.   
 224. Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the Qualified-
immunity Defense,” 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447 (2000) (noting from a judge’s perspective 
the complexity of qualified immunity law).  
 225. See, e.g., Kinports, supra note 42, at 64 (2016) (arguing that “the Court has engaged in a 
pattern of covertly  broadening the defense, describing it in increasingly generous terms . . . .”); Barbara 
E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 664-65 (1998) (arguing 
that the doctrine does too much to protect officers). 
 226. Jeffries, The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, supra  note 13, at 246; Blum, The Maze, 
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will cast light on those problems by focusing almost all § 1983 litigation 
on the application of the qualified immunity test.227  Since qualified 
immunity would be the major pivot point in most cases under § 1983, 
more attention might hopefully be paid to making sure the doctrine is 
functioning properly. 
In response to these arguments, one might argue that eliminating 
Monell’s “policy and custom” doctrine will, in return for efficiency and 
less cost, prevent plaintiffs from challenging widespread patterns and 
practices of abuse on the part of municipal defendants.228  If evidence 
about municipal policies, customs, training, practices, and patterns of 
past violations are no longer required to establish the municipality’s 
liability, then perhaps plaintiffs would no longer be able to seek such 
evidence, or to pursue systemic changes in municipal policies and 
practices.  However, the changes proposed here would not prevent 
plaintiffs from challenging or seeking to enjoin municipal policies, 
customs, or practices. Plaintiffs would simply no longer be required to 
raise such challenges to hold a municipal government liable for the 
violation of the plaintiff’s rights by an individual officer.  In particular, 
the class action mechanism would remain available as a vehicle for 
plaintiffs to challenge and enjoin municipal policies or customs that 
violate rights on a widespread basis.229 While it is true that, under 
current law, it can be difficult to pursue injunctive relief against cities 
under § 1983,230 the changes proposed by this Article would not increase 
that difficulty. 
B. Improve Municipal Defendants’ Incentives and Deterrence without 
Massively Expanding Their Liability 
The next argument in favor of the proposal is that it would improve 
incentives and deterrence for cities by limiting liability for violations 
 
supra note 13, at 947.  
 227. The remaining exception would be cases involving absolute immunity for officers 
performing judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial functions. Cf. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 
13, at 209-10 (arguing for replacing absolute immunity with qualified immunity).  
 228. See Blum, supra note 13, at 920 (arguing that “there may be some value to playing the 
Monell game” for discovery and settlement purposes); Taylor, supra note 22, at 749 (noting that pursuit 
of discovery required to make out Monell claims can confer advantages on plaintiffs and allow 
challenges to systemic abuses); Futterman et al., supra note 28, at 255, 259-60 (noting how statistical 
investigation conducted to support particular plaintiffs’ claims unearthed patterns of systemic abuses in 
Chicago); see also Obrycka v. City of Chicago, No. 07 C 2372, 2012 WL 3903673, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
7, 2012) (plaintiff attempted to make out Monell claims using statistical evidence about excessive force 
complaints in Chicago). 
 229. See, e.g.,  See, e.g., Smith v. City of Chicago, 143 F. Supp. 3d 741, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2015) 
(denying motion to dismiss class action claims challenging Chicago police practices). 
 230. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
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that cities are more able to prevent, while also removing the incentive 
for cities to create distance between their policies or policymakers and 
their “line” officers in hopes of avoiding the imposition of municipal 
liability.231  At the same time, because cities would now be allowed to 
assert qualified immunity, and because cities already currently tend to 
indemnify their officers, there would not be the massive expansion of 
municipal liability about which the Court fretted in crafting its Monell 
rules.232  
Under the current doctrinal status quo, cities have a sort of “know 
nothing” incentive when it comes to monitoring and preventing 
constitutional torts by their officers. A municipal defendant can avoid 
liability for a violation if it can show it was not attributable to a formal 
policy,233 if it can show its executives were not aware of other similar 
incidents,234 if it can show that its “policymakers” were not responsible 
for the conduct in question,235 or if it can show that it was unaware of 
similar violation that would have put it on notice of the need to train 
officers to prevent them.236  In each aspect, the danger for a city is that it 
allows itself or its policymakers to be connected to, or held responsible 
for, the conduct of the “line” officers. The “policy” and “custom” 
doctrine creates a tracing exercise that gives cities incentives to distance 
individual officers’ actions from official policies and upper-level 
decision makers.   
However, under this Article’s proposal, the incentives would change. 
 
 231. Joanna Schwartz has argued, persuasively, that it should not be presumed that civil-rights 
lawsuits necessarily have a deterrent effect, because not all cities track, process, or respond to lawsuits 
filed against officers.  Joanna Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in 
Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1023, 1040 (2010).  As Schwartz notes, however, 
at least some municipal governments do track that information and use it to identify problem officers, or 
change internal policies, and those that do have strengthened the deterrent effect of lawsuits.  Id. at 
1067-68.   More broadly, Daryl Levinson has argued that cities simply are not deterred in the same way 
as private economic actors.  Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000); but see Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense 
of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 
866 (2001).  Rather than joining this debate, this Article simply argues that to the extent lawsuits do 
affect cities’ incentives, or deter wrongdoing by their officers, this article’s proposal would give cities 
better incentives.  
 232. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 844 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The 
Court's contrary conclusion can only be explained by a concern about the danger of bankrupting 
municipal corporations.”). 
 233. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-90 (1989) (making the point that when a 
municipal defendant has an official policy to which the violation is attributable, the fault and causation 
of the violation are directly established).  
 234. See, e.g., id.; Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 72 (2011) (holding that district attorney’s 
office could not be held liable when plaintiffs’ attorneys had failed to establish a pattern of similar 
violations).   
 235. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988).   
 236. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). 
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Cities no longer will have to worry about a federal court retrospectively 
second-guessing their policy, custom, policymaking, or training as 
plaintiffs attempt to forge a link between an individual officer’s conduct 
and the city itself.  Further, the fact that the city did not have a policy, or 
cannot be charged with knowledge of a practice, will not save the city 
from liability.  If the officer violated clearly established law, then the 
city will be liable. So, cities will have much greater incentives to ensure 
that their policies, customs, decision making, and training all operate to 
ensure that officers are not engaging in conduct that violates clearly 
established law.  
At the same time, allowing municipal defendants the benefit of 
qualified immunity will help ensure that they are not over-deterred.  The 
proposed change will, therefore, better align the deterrence provided by 
the statute. Under the current approach, cities can be held liable for 
offenses that are unforeseeable, and therefore difficult (if not 
impossible) to deter.237  At the same time, cities can avoid liability even 
when their officers are engaging in conduct that violates clearly 
established law, so long as they can obscure any connection between the 
violation and the city’s official policy, policymakers, or unofficial 
custom.238  The proposed changes will eliminate the “know nothing” 
incentive and replace it with an incentive to monitor and prevent abuses.   
At the same time, these changes will not unduly expand or contract 
municipal liability.  First, these changes will not massively expand 
municipal liability, despite the worries expressed by the Court in 
choosing and adhering to Monell liability rather than adopting a 
respondeat superior regime.239  One main reason for this is that, in cases 
in which officers are held liable despite their assertion of qualified 
immunity, cities already routinely, and indeed almost always, indemnify 
those officers.240  That is, even in cases where an officer is held liable 
but the city escapes liability based on the Monell rules, the city is likely 
to pay the judgment anyway.241 
Probably the only category of case to which municipal liability would 
be newly expanded would be cases in which an officer’s intentional 
conduct was so egregious that a city would refuse to indemnify the 
officer—most notably, cases of willful and malicious violations of 
constitutional rights by “bad cops.”242 It might be argued that it is simply 
 
 237. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 665 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); 
Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 244-46.  
 238. See, e.g., Connick, 563 U.S. at 71 (defendant District Attorney’s office avoided liability for 
Brady violation by prosecutors).  
 239. Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.). 
 240. Schwartz, supra note 23, at 911-13. 
 241. Id.  
 242. One recent example which received significant media attention was the series of sexual 
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unfair to impose liability on the cities for the willful bad acts of its 
officers that the city did not direct, encourage, or know about.  A few 
responses can be made against this, however.  First, even as to cases 
where the officer was disregarding policy or going around the rules, 
imposing liability will give cities an incentive to develop better 
mechanisms, practices, and reporting to catch or preemptively get rid of 
rule-breaking “rogue cops” that are committing willful rights 
violations.243  Second, these types of cases are often ones in which the 
violation of the plaintiff’s rights is the most severe or objectionable and 
in which, therefore, it is most important to ensure that the plaintiff is 
actually compensated, rather than the proud winner of an uncollectible 
damages judgment against a disgraced and penniless officer.244  In a 
case where a municipal officer willfully violated the plaintiff’s clearly 
established rights, as between such a plaintiff and the city that employed 
the “bad cop,” it is more fitting that the city bear the cost of the loss.245  
Moreover, under the proposed changes, this expanded liability for the 
“worst” violations will be balanced by ending Owen’s municipal strict 
liability for “good faith” violations that did not violate clearly 
established law.246 Finally, municipalities can take insurance against 
such losses.247  
The contrary concern is that the proposed changes will unduly 
contract municipal liability by giving municipal defendants the benefit 
of the very powerful qualified immunity defense.  That might, in turn, 
make municipal defendants even less responsive to deterrence by suit 
under §1983.  Cities like Albuquerque, Baltimore, and Chicago—all of 
which have been found by the Department of Justice to have engaged in 
systematic and widespread abusive policing—will only be further 
emboldened by giving them additional shelter from liability.248 
 
assaults perpetrated by Oklahoma City Police Officer Daniel Holzclaw.  See 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ex-oklahoma-city-cop-daniel-holtzclaw-found-guilty-rapes-
n478151 (noting Holzclaw’s conviction and 263-year sentence for abusing his office to force arrestees 
into sex).   
 243. See, e.g., Molly Redden, “Daniel Holtzclaw: lawsuit claims police 'covered up' sexual assault 
complaint,” THE GUARDIAN, March 8, 2016, available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/mar/08/daniel-holtzclaw-lawsuit-sexual-assault-complaint-police-cover-up (describing 
alleged cover-up by Oklahoma City police in Holzclaw case). 
 244. The Holzclaw case, again, is a good example of this scenario; the individual officer has been 
sentenced to over 200 years in prison and is unlikely to have funds to pay judgments against his score of 
victims. 
 245. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654 (1980) ( “Elemental notions of 
fairness dictate that one who causes a loss should bear the loss.”). 
 246. See, e.g., id. at 683 (Powell, J., dissenting) (calling for allowing municipal defendants a 
good-faith defense).  
 247. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 844 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 248. See, e.g., Department of Justice Investigation of the Chicago Police Department, January 13, 
2017, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download; Department of Justice 
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Against this several things can be said. One is that the proposal does 
not merely give the cities a new defense; it also makes it significantly 
easier to hold the cities liable by imposing respondeat superior.  Said 
another way, while the qualified immunity defense is defendant friendly, 
so too is municipal liability doctrine. While there is no good statistical 
research on the question, subjective and anecdotal observations suggest 
that proving Monell liability is probably at least as difficult as 
overcoming qualified immunity.249 The Court’s own cases describe the 
inquiry as “rigorous.”250  Thus, as a practical matter, the proposed 
changes are not going to significantly curtail municipal liability so much 
as to shift it from a focus on municipal policy to a focus on cases in 
which there was a violation of the plaintiff’s clearly established rights.  
Finally, there are other remedies available in the case of the “rogue 
city”—the scenario where it is not merely isolated officers but entire 
police forces or municipal governments that engage in systemic abuses.  
One is the pursuit of injunctive relief, possibly in the context of class 
action claims.251  The qualified immunity defense is a defense to 
damages liability only; therefore, municipal defendants would not be 
able to invoke it in defending against injunctive claims.  The changes 
proposed by this Article would thus have no limiting effect on the ability 
of plaintiffs to seek injunctions to end systemic abusive practices.  
Another remedy is investigation and sanction by the Department of 
Justice, as happened in the cases of each of the cities mentioned 
above,252 though admittedly the likelihood of such action will vary 
 
Investigation of Baltimore City Police Department, August 10, 2016, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download; 
DOJ Report of Findings--Albuquerque Police Department Investigation, April 10, 2014, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/04/10/apd_findings_4-10-14.pdf (each 
finding systemic violations and abuses by the city police departments investigated). 
 249. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 13, at 916-17 (noting the difficulty of pleading and proving 
Monell claims under the Court’s current doctrine); Surell Brady, Municipal Liability for Police 
Misconduct: Experiences in the Eighth Circuit, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81, 104 (1997) (“Decisional 
law demonstrates that cases meeting the Monell standard are few and far between.”). 
 250. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 75 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Cmmrs v. Brown, 520 
U.S. 397, 398 (1997)). 
 251. There are significant limits on the ability of an individual plaintiff to seek and receive 
injunctive relief. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); see also Futterman et al, 
Chicago’s Broken System, supra note 28 (noting difficulties under Lyons in getting injunctions against 
police abuses). But in the case where the defendant city’s officers are engaging in systemic violations of 
rights, injunctive relief should be more readily available). See, e.g., Smith v. City of Chicago, 143 F. 
Supp. 3d 741, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (denying motion to dismiss class action claims challenging Chicago 
police practices). 
 252. See  DOJ-Baltimore consent decree, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/12/us/baltimore-consent-decree.html; DOJ-Albuquerque 
settlement agreement, available at http://documents.cabq.gov/justice-department/settlement-
agreement.pdf. 
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greatly based on the politics of the incumbent administration.253  
C. Making It Easier for Deserving Plaintiffs to Plead and Recover; 
Eliminating Strict-Liability Recoveries 
If cities are liable in respondeat superior, then plaintiffs with strong 
claims254 will find it easier to prove their cases against municipal 
defendants, have an easier time recovering, and might also get more 
generous recoveries.   
First, eliminating the Monell doctrine will make it easier for plaintiffs 
with strong cases to prove those cases against municipal defendants.  
Plaintiffs will no longer have to plead and prove “policy and custom” to 
hold cities liable, and it will become much easier for plaintiffs with 
strong substantive claims against municipal defendants to more easily 
survive motions to dismiss and summary judgment.  Because current 
municipal liability doctrine requires proof about a municipal defendant’s 
policies, customs, practices, training, discipline, and record of past 
incidents,255 a plaintiff pleading claims against a municipal defendant 
must allege facts often beyond the plaintiff’s knowledge, such as who 
may have given orders to the officers who violated the plaintiff’s rights, 
internal department policies, the content of municipal training, and 
records of prior incidents.256  Further, the advent of the Twombly/Iqbal 
heightened standard of pleading to survive a motion to dismiss means 
that, before discovery even begins, a plaintiff who wishes to plead 
claims against a municipal defendant must plead enough facts to meet 
the “plausibility” standard.257  Failure to do so can lead to the dismissal 
of municipal liability claims at the outset of the case.258   
 
 253. See Attorney General Memorandum, March 31, 2017, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/954916/download ; Sari Horvitz, “Sessions Orders Justice 
Department to Review All Police Reform Agreements, WASH. POST, April 3, 2017, available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-orders-justice-department-to-review-
all-police-reform-agreements/2017/04/03/ba934058-18bd-11e7-9887-
1a5314b56a08_story.html?utm_term=.e323a55048ef   
 254. By “plaintiffs with strong claims” the Article means “plaintiffs whose clearly established 
constitutional rights have been violated.” 
 255. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 
(1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New 
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 256. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 22, at 753-58.   
 257. McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 258. See, e.g., McCauley, 671 F.3d at 617 (dismissing municipal liability claims for failure to 
meet Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard); Gonzales v. Nueces Cty., Texas, 227 F. Supp. 3d 698, 705 
(S.D. Tex. 2017) (dismissing plaintiff’s Monell claims for failure to meet Twombly standard because 
plaintiff failed to plead “such policies apparent from high level admissions of deficiencies in police 
training or any statistics showing a significant number of similar instances.”); Saleem v. Sch. Dist. of 
Philadelphia, 2013 WL 5763206, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2013) (dismissing complaint for failure to 
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The changes proposed by this Article would make it much easier for 
plaintiffs’ claims against municipal defendants to survive dismissal 
because, in order to keep the municipal defendant in the case, a plaintiff 
would only need to show that the officer was acting within the scope of 
employment with the municipal defendant.259  The focus of summary 
judgment litigation would be redirected and narrowed to the question 
whether the individual officers conduct violated clearly established 
law—that is, the question of qualified immunity260—and plaintiffs’ 
claims would no longer routinely be dismissed for failure to sufficiently 
plead municipal policies, customs, training, or patterns of similar 
incidents.261 
Closely related, plaintiffs will also have an easier time recovering 
against municipal defendants.  Because the municipal defendant will be 
liable in respondeat superior, successful plaintiffs will have direct 
access to recovery from the “deeper pocket” municipal defendant, rather 
than having to rely on collecting from an individual officer or hoping 
that the individual officer will be indemnified by her employer.262  
While it is true that municipal defendants usually indemnify their 
officers, changing the basis of liability to respondeat superior will 
eliminate the risk of an uncollectible judgment against an individual 
officer. 
Finally, respondeat superior liability for municipal defendants may 
also improve the size of recoveries for victorious plaintiffs.  Juries may 
be more willing to award significant damages to plaintiffs if the 
municipal defendant is still in the case.263 Lawyers who represent these 
 
provide “factual details regarding the existence, scope or application of the alleged School District 
policy, practice, procedure or custom of the School District”); Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 
1141 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing Monell claims for failure to adequately plead policy and custom 
under Twombly). 
 259. Cf, e.g., Restatement (Third) Agency § 7.07 cmt. c. (“[C]onduct is not outside the scope of 
employment merely because an employee  disregards the employer’s instructions.”). 
 260. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).   
 261. See, e.g., Surell Brady, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct: Experiences in the Eighth 
Circuit, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81, 104 (1997) (noting that current doctrine makes it difficult for 
Monell plaintiffs to prevail); see also cases cited supra note 258. 
 262. The practice of widespread indemnification of officers by cities might make this advantage 
of more limited value.  See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 913 
(2014) (concluding via empirical study that municipal governments indemnify individual officers for 
99% of dollars paid in judgments under 42 U.S.C. §1983).  However, keeping the municipal defendant 
actually in the case could give plaintiffs more settlement leverage, especially if plaintiffs’ attorneys or 
even the defendants have limited knowledge about whether the municipal defendant will indemnify the 
officers, see Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 583, 
588 n.17 (1998) (noting that the issue of indemnification may not be settled until after the primary 
litigation is complete); or if the defendants know that the presence of the municipal defendant in the 
case will increase juries’ willingness to award significant damages if the case goes to trial.   
 263. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 232 (“[T]he jury (for those cases that get to the 
jury) might be more willing to impose liability on a government than on an individual, or to increase the 
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defendants seem to think that is a serious risk of exposing cities to 
respondeat superior liability.264  That risk, in turn, might lead to more 
and more generous settlements in deserving plaintiffs’ favor as 
municipal defendant agree to terms in order to avoid jury verdicts.   
At the same time, eliminating “strict municipal liability” by allowing 
cities the benefit of qualified immunity will cut off recovery for less 
deserving plaintiffs. The plaintiff who recovers in an Owen scenario is 
in the sense the beneficiary of a windfall: at the time of the defendants’ 
conduct, that conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional 
law, but the plaintiff benefits from a development in the law that 
subsequently clearly established the violation.265 If one accepts that 
liability under §1983 should be fault-based, then recoveries like these 
are given to plaintiffs who are undeserving. 
Admittedly, the question of whether recovery should be fault-based 
has been hotly contested. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in 
Owen, as well as many academics, have argued that the principle of § 
1983 recovery should be compensation for constitutional violations 
without regard to fault.266 Others, most notably John Jeffries, have 
argued that recovery under § 1983 should be fault based.267 Without 
repeating those arguments here, this Article agrees with and relies on 
Jeffries’ arguments: a fault requirement aligns with ideas of corrective 
justice268 and is also necessary to prevent over deterrence of officials as 
well as to promote constitutional innovation.269   
In addition, whether or not liability should be fault-based, it in fact 
currently is, and if it is to be fault-based then liability should be based 
directly on the defendant’s degree of fault.  The Court developed the 
unwieldy and convoluted “policy and custom” Monell doctrine to build 
 
damages when liability is found.”). 
 264. See Lisa D. Hawke, Municipal Liability and Respondeat Superior: An Empirical Study and 
Analysis, 38 SUFFOLK L. REV. 831, 846-47 (2005) (noting that municipal attorneys oppose the 
imposition of respondeat superior liability for this reason).  
 265. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 669-70 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).  
 266. See, e.g., id. at 654 ( “Elemental notions of fairness dictate that one who causes a loss should 
bear the loss.”), 644-46 (analogizing the Court’s adoption of strict liability for municipal governments to 
the development of strict liability doctrines in the common law of torts); Mark R. Brown, The Failure of 
Fault Under § 1983: Municipal Liability for State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1503, 1505 
(1999); Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons from Tort Law and 
Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1780 (1989) (arguing for strict municipal liability as a loss-
spreading measure). 
 267. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Compensation For Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the 
Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 95 (1989). 
 268. Id. at 96-98 (1989) (arguing that notions of corrective justice require fault); John C. Jeffries, 
Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 53 (1998) (“[A] 
constitutional tort regime based on fault is wise policy.”). 
 269. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 242-50 (arguing that a fault-based regime is 
necessary to prevent overdeterrence and promote constitutional innovation).  
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back in the fault that Owen removed from the analysis.270 Thus, for 
example, the doctrine requires either direct municipal policy, or at least 
“deliberate indifference” on the part of policymakers, to hold the 
municipal defendant liable for an individual officer’s violation.271 Rather 
than getting at fault obliquely through the convoluted and hard-to-apply 
Monell doctrine, it would be better to do so directly through the 
application of qualified immunity.272  As between a plaintiff whose 
clearly established rights were violated by an individual officer but with 
no clear connection to municipal policy or custom, and a plaintiff whose 
subsequently established rights were violated by an officer acting under 
a clear directive from municipal policy or custom, it seems that the 
former is the plaintiff more deserving of recovery.273  The changes 
proposed by this Article would shift recoveries in line with this intuition. 
D.  Furthering Federalism by Reducing Direct Federal Court Scrutiny 
of and Interference with Municipal Policies, Practices, Customs, and 
Training 
The final major policy argument in favor of the proposal is that it will 
further the value of federalism that the Court has recognized as an 
important policy consideration in interpreting § 1983.274  Further, as 
already discussed, it will do so without significantly impairing (and will 
in fact further) the other main, and countervailing, policy consideration 
behind the statute: remedying and deterring violations of citizens’ 
federal rights by state and local officials.275  
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that, in interpreting § 1983, it 
must take care to avoid imposing liability in ways that unduly interfere 
with the powers and abilities of state and local governments to structure 
their own operations.276 This principle is behind the doctrinal 
developments as the “policy and custom” requirement itself, as well as 
several of the refinements of that doctrine. For example, federalism 
considerations drove the Court’s adoption of the rule that State (not 
 
 270. See, e.g., Bd. of Cty. Cmmrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-06 (1997); see also Jeffries, The 
Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 243.   
 271. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).  
 272. Id. at 250-54 (arguing for a modified qualified immunity standard as the best liability rule for 
constitutional tort litigation). 
 273. Cf. Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 490 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The 
primary responsibility for protecting the constitutional rights of the residents of Hamilton County from 
the officers of Hamilton County should rest on the shoulders of the county itself, rather than on the 
several agents who were trying to perform their jobs.”) 
 274. See, e.g., McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785-86 (1997); Jett v. Dallas Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737-38 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988). 
 275. See supra Parts II. B and C.  
 276. See, e.g., McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785-86; Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124.  
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federal) law governs the question whether a particular government 
official is a local “policymaker,” whose actions can expose a municipal 
defendant to liability.277  Similarly, federalism considerations prompted 
the Court to emphasize that State law governs whether a particular 
policymaker is making policy for the State, which is immune from § 
1983 liability, or for a local government entity, which can be held liable 
for the policy.278 
While federalism has driven the Court’s development of its Monell 
doctrine, that doctrine is actually highly intrusive into local government 
affairs. The current “policy and custom” doctrine requires plaintiffs, in 
order to hold cities liable, to litigate broad questions about municipal 
policy, allocations of policymaking authority under state and local law, 
local custom, and a particular entity’s hiring and training practices.279 
All these aspects of local government, therefore, are subjected to federal 
review under the current doctrine. So, for example, while the Court 
rejected respondeat superior for failure-to-train claims because it did 
not want to “engage the federal courts in an endless exercise of second-
guessing municipal employee-training programs,”280 as a practical 
matter the Court’s doctrine requires doing just that.281 
Moreover, the doctrine’s emphasis on official policy and 
policymaking means that federal court scrutiny in these cases is directed 
at the apex officials (the policymakers) of local government.282 Because 
it is necessary to prove that policymakers made or at least knew of a 
certain policy or custom, it is often necessary to depose them and 
discover their policy-related documents.283  The Court has frequently 
supported its immunity doctrines on the grounds that immunity is 
necessary to allow officials to robustly perform their official duties.284  
But the Monell doctrine promotes, and indeed requires, scrutinizing and 
 
 277. See, e.g., Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124 (1988).  
 278. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785-86. 
 279. See, e.g., McMillian, 520 U.S. at 791-93 (1997) (whether policymaker makes policy for State 
or local government); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (training practices); Jett, 491 
U.S. at 737-38 (allocation of policymaking authority under state law); Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 184 
(decisions by policymakers); Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1986) (whether 
officials are policymakers);  Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 662 (1978) 
(official policies); see also Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously, supra note 65, at 2188 (noting the 
separate “paths” to municipal liability under Monell).  
 280. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392. 
 281. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 22, at 752-53 (describing extensive discovery needed to make 
out a failure-to-discipline case under City of Canton).  
 282. See, e.g., McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 283. See, e.g., Bishop v. Arcuri, 674 F.3d 456, 468 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing testimony of San 
Antonio police chief as “relevant law enforcement policymaker for the city” about San Antonio’s police 
practices in lawsuit challenging failure to “knock and announce” before executing drug search warrant). 
 284. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
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interfering with the executive officials of municipal defendants—an 
intrusion into State and local interests that is actually much more severe 
than potentially imposing liability on the local government’s low-level 
officers. Thus, while the intent of the doctrine is to serve federalism by 
preserving the discretion and policymaking freedom of local 
governments,285 the effect above is the opposite—a confusing set of 
rules that requires intensive scrutiny of local policies, executive decision 
making, and patterns and practices of conduct.286  Moreover, and 
importantly, the current doctrine requires that scrutiny in all cases in 
which a plaintiff wishes to hold a municipal defendant responsible, even 
run-of-the-mine cases in which a plaintiff mainly seeks money damages 
for a single incident.  The doctrine is casually intrusive into local 
interests, as opposed to reserving such intrusion for cases in which the 
point of the lawsuit is to challenge or to change municipal policy at a 
systemic level. 
In contrast, under the proposed change, federal courts will no longer 
be placed in the position of routinely scrutinizing local policies and 
policymakers. This is because a plaintiff will not have to show anything 
about the city’s policies or customs in order to hold the city liable; they 
will simply have to demonstrate that the individual officer violated the 
plaintiff’s rights and that the officer’s conduct was conduct that a 
reasonable officer should have known violated clearly established law at 
the time of the conduct (i.e., that the officer is not entitled to qualified 
immunity).287 In the ordinary case where a plaintiff sues for individual 
recovery based on a single incident, federal courts will no longer have to 
engage in intrusive discovery into and examination of municipal policies 
and practices,288 nor to make findings about structures and 
responsibilities created by state and local government law.289 Federal 
courts will be mostly out of the business of reviewing and revising state 
and local policy,290 supervising intrusive discovery into and examination 
of municipal training policies and practices, and investigating difficult 
questions about the allocation of policymaking powers and roles under 
 
 285. See, e.g., City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392 . 
 286. See Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 234-37; Gonzales v. Nueces Cty., Texas, 
227 F. Supp. 3d 698, 705 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (dismissing claims for failure to identify policies or patterns 
of violations).  
 287. See Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 234 (explaining the proposal).  
 288. See, e.g., Bishop, 674 F.3d at 468. 
 289. See, e.g., McMillian, 520 U.S. at 790-93. 
 290. The exception, as noted above, would be suits in which plaintiffs attempt to bring a systemic 
challenge to a particular municipal defendant’s policies or institutional abuses. See supra notes 228-230 
and accompanying text.   
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particular states’ law.291 The qualified immunity defense will protect the 
city from unwarranted liability, just as it does so now for individual 
officers, but without the added level of scrutiny into municipal policies, 
customs, and practices currently required by the Monell doctrine.  
Cities, for their part, will have much greater flexibility to set policy, 
custom, and training for their officers, because those will no longer be 
subject to direct scrutiny in most § 1983 suits. However, that increased 
flexibility will be accompanied by the knowledge that if they fail to 
prevent or deter violations of clearly established constitutional rights by 
their officers, they will be held liable in respondeat superior under 
§1983. Thus, the test of liability for cities will not be an evaluation of 
their policies, their customs, or their training, but simply an evaluation 
of the end results—whether their officers are violating clearly 
established rights, or not. With the focus of § 1983 litigation narrowed 
and clarified to the question of whether an individual officer’s conduct 
violated clearly established constitutional rights,292 cities will be freer to 
adopt policies and procedures that they think are best designed to avoid 
such violations. But, if poor choices by municipal defendants lead to 
officers violating clearly established laws, they can be held liable 
without the need for fine-grained inquiries into state and local 
government law or municipal policy and procedure.293 The cities will be 
allowed to choose their own means, and the federal courts will stand 
ready to determine whether those means are effective at accomplishing 
federal ends—preventing local officers from violating citizens’ 
constitutional rights. Further, to the extent plaintiffs want to challenge 
and seek to enjoin municipal policies at a systemic level, they can still 
do so, e.g., through multiple-plaintiff actions—but they will no longer 
be required to do so in order to recover against municipal defendants.294 
III. THE PROPOSAL IS POSSIBLE AND FEASIBLE  
Part II argued that the proposed changes are good policy, and this Part 
aims to show that the proposal is both possible and feasible. The 
 
 291. See, e.g., McMillian, 520 U.S. at 791-93 (rejecting petitioner’s argument Alabama sheriffs 
are county officials and holding Alabama law supports the decision sheriffs represent the state of 
Alabama because they report directly to the state); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737-38 
(1989) (in determining whether the Dallas Independent School District has final policymaking authority, 
lower courts are better equipped to interpret Texas law to decide whether the school district officials 
have the power to make and implement official policies). 
 292. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).   
 293. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Nueces Cty., Texas, 227 F. Supp. 3d 698, 705 (S.D. Tex. 2017) 
(discussing the showing required under current doctrine to establish that a plaintiff’s injuries were 
caused by municipal policy or custom).  
 294. E.g., Smith v. City of Chicago, 143 F. Supp. 3d 741, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (class action 
raising broad challenge to Chicago’s stop-and-frisk practices). 
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proposal is possible in the sense that the proposed changes can be 
justified in terms of the conventional sources of statutory interpretation, 
on which the Court purports to base its § 1983 doctrine. It is feasible in 
the sense that there are several reasons to think the Court might be 
willing to make such a change: the Court’s history of making major 
changes to § 1983 doctrine in response to perceived policy needs; the 
Court’s current pronounced enthusiasm for the doctrine of qualified 
immunity paired with its less-enthusiastic embrace of Monell doctrine; 
and finally the appealing nature of the proposal as a compromise that 
imposes broader liability on municipal defendants but also gives them 
access to the robust qualified-immunity defense.  
A. The Proposal Is Possible Because the Changes Can Be Justified as 
Allowed by Text, Legislative History, and Common Law   
The proposed changes are possible in the sense that they can be 
justified in terms of conventional sources of interpretation such as text, 
legislative history, and common law. The proposal is admittedly 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s current doctrine—it would 
require reversing both Monell’s holding that cities may not be subjected 
to respondeat superior liability,295 and Owen’s holding that cities may 
not invoke the qualified immunity defense.296 But it can be squared with 
the interpretive methods the Court has relied on in developing the 
doctrine of §1983—textual interpretation,297 consultation of the 
legislative history of § 1983,298 and analogies to common-law tort 
rules.299 
The claim here is not that these conventional sources require the 
proposed changes. It is merely the weaker point that, just as the Court 
has used these sources to support its largely policy-driven evolution of § 
1983 doctrine in the past, so too can those sources be used to justify the 
changes proposed by this Article. Many scholars have argued that the 
Court’s interpretive choices are not truly driven or constrained by these 
sources and are instead mostly driven by policy concerns.300 
 
 295. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).  
 296. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980). 
 297. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-93 (holding that cities are suable “persons” under section 
1983 but that the phrase “causes to be subjected” limits their liability more narrowly than full 
respondeat superior).  
 298. See, e.g., id. at 665-90; Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635-44 (1980). 
 299. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) (“[I]n enacting § 
1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common 
law.”).   
 300. See, e.g.,  Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(Posner, J) (arguing that the Court’s Monell doctrine is best understood as a policy compromise to limit 
interference with local governments’ budgets and protect taxpayers); Kit Kinports, Quiet Expansion of 
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Furthermore, the evidence of the Court’s own decisions suggests that it 
is not these sources that are determining the Courts’ decisions, because 
the Justices have read these sources contradictorily on key questions 
about the interpretation of § 1983. Most notably, in Monroe, the Court 
read the legislative history of § 1983 as forbidding any liability for 
cities,301 but in Monell, the Court read the same history the other way.302 
The Monell majority read the same legislative history as prohibiting 
respondeat superior liability,303 while Justice Stevens consistently read 
the same legislative history as supporting respondeat superior.304 This 
author shares the view that, at least on specific doctrinal questions like 
the ones considered in this Article, the conventional sources are truly 
indeterminate; there is, for example, no one correct understanding of 
what the Congress’s rejection of the Sherman Amendment “really 
meant.”305 
Nonetheless, the Court itself has mostly purported in its decisions to 
be basing its choices on conventional sources,306 though some Justices 
have occasionally recommended that the Court should be more frank 
that it is basing its choices on policy,307 or have criticized the Court for 
not actually being rigorous about its consultation of common law to 
 
Qualified Immunity, supra note 42, at 62-63 (arguing that the Court is substantively and surreptitiously 
broadening the defense and that its interpretation is not justified by legislative history); John M. Greabe, 
A Better Path for Constitutional Tort Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 205 (2008) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has openly acknowledged its willingness to rewrite the text of section 1983 to create a regime that 
‘better’ balances competing policy considerations than does the actual law that Congress passed.”); Eric 
A Harrington, Judicial Misuse of History and §1983: Toward a Purpose-Based Approach, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 999 (2007) (arguing that Court has misread historical sources in interpreting the statute); Michael 
Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 MISS. L.J. 157 (1998) (noting 
that the Court’s use of common law analogs to interpret section 1983 has been inconsistent in Court’s 
use of and deviation from common law principles). 
 301. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (concluding that the Congress’s rejection of the 
proposed Sherman Amendment indicated that Congress did not intend for the statute to subject cities to 
liability).  
 302. Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-90  (reading the legislative history, including the rejection of the 
Sherman Amendment, as allowing municipal liability). 
 303. Id. at 692-93. 
 304. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 838-40 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 305. Compare Monroe with Monell; see also Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights 
Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 605 (1985) (“[T]wo decades of 
excursions into the Congressional Globe of 1871 have convinced most observers that the legislative 
history of section 1983 is, in the main, unhelpful . . . . [F]ew lawyers are unable to find support for their 
position in those turbulent debates.”). 
 306. Baude, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that the Court has purported to justify its qualified 
immunity jurisprudence based on these sources);  Jack M. Beermann, Common Law Elements of the 
Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 695, 698 (1997) (“Overall, the Court’s methodology . . . has 
been highly oriented toward legislative intent and policy, with the common law playing an important 
role.”). 
 307. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Once it is 
established that the common law of 1871 provides us with no real guidance on this question, we should 
turn to the policies underlying §1983 to determine which rule best accords with those policies.”). 
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drive its decision making.308 Thus, while critics might be right that the 
Court’s interpretive approach in § 1983 cases is inconsistent or 
indefensible, for a proposed change to have a chance of being adopted 
by the Court, it needs to be justifiable in terms of the interpretive 
methods the Court has employed in its prior cases interpreting the 
statute. This section briefly offers those justifications.  
1.  Text 
Section 1983’s short text does not answer most of the questions that 
have arisen about how to interpret the statute to establish liability rules 
and defenses for suits under the statute.309  On one of the questions at 
issue in this Article—whether cities should be allowed the benefit of the 
qualified immunity defense—it has literally nothing to say because the 
qualified immunity defense itself has no basis in the text of § 1983.310  
The Court decided to recognize the immunity because it (or an 
analogue) had been available to officers at the time of the adoption of 
the statute, and the Court reasoned that since Congress did not expressly 
eliminate that defense it must have intended to allow it in litigation 
under the new statute.311  
There is one textual hook, however, that might argue for allowing 
cities to invoke the qualified immunity defense: the statute refers only to 
one type of defendant, i.e., “persons.”312  Cities are viable defendants 
under § 1983 because the Court has concluded that they are “persons” 
under § 1983.313 Since the text refers only to “persons” as defendants 
under § 1983, then arguably every defendant “person” should be 
allowed the benefit of the same defenses available to other defendants 
under § 1983.   
As for the extent and nature of municipal liability under the statute, 
the text has a bit more to say, and the Court has considered the text in 
crafting its current rules.  Initially concluding in Monroe that 
municipalities are not “persons,”314 the Monell Court reversed this 
 
 308. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1871-72 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment) (arguing that the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence has deviated from 
applying common law precedents into an quasi-legislative exercise in balancing policy interests). 
 309. Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of 
Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 54-57 (1989) (noting the limits of the text in resolving interpretive questions 
about the section 1983 cause of action). 
 310. Baude, supra note 16, at 6.  
 311. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967); but see Baude, supra note 16, at 11-17 
(arguing that the Court erred in its reasoning for importing the qualified immunity defense into section 
1983).  
 312. 42 U.S.C. §1983.  
 313. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. Of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).  
 314. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).   
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holding based on a more expansive reading of “person,” as well as its 
revisit of the legislative history.315  In doing so, however, the Court in 
Monell concluded that the statutory phrase “causes to be subjected” 
required something more than mere respondeat superior liability; it 
required proof of direct responsibility or causation on the part of the 
municipal defendant.316 This, then, was the textual hook for the 
complicated doctrine of Monell liability that this Article proposes to 
eliminate.   
The text of the statute allows for and can justify this proposed change. 
As several Justices have agreed, the textual “causes to be subjected” can 
easily be read to include respondeat superior liability for municipal 
defendants; the municipal defendant “causes” the plaintiff “to be 
subjected” to injury by employing the officer who, acting under color of 
law, violates the plaintiff’s rights.317  Several Justices and scholars have 
agreed with this argument. The injection of an extra limits in the form of 
a deliberate-indifference fault standard and a more stringent requirement 
of causation is entirely a judicial invention.  Further, as Justice Stevens 
repeatedly pointed out, the word “policy”—from which so much of the 
Monell doctrine has grown—appears nowhere in the text of § 1983.318  It 
would, therefore, be more faithful to the text of § 1983 to eliminate the 
convoluted “policy” requirement altogether.  Thus, the text itself is no 
bar to the imposition of respondeat superior liability on municipal 
defendants, and arguably is the better reading of the text. 
2.  Legislative History 
The legislative history of § 1983 allows, at a minimum, plausible 
arguments that the legislative history of the statute supports both of the 
changes proposed by this Article.  On the question of municipal liability, 
factions of the Court (and scholars) have delved deeply into the 
legislative history in an attempt to determine whether the Congress of 
1871 intended that municipal governments should be liable under 
§1983, and if so whether that liability should be respondeat superior or 
somehow more limited to cases in which the municipal government was 
 
 315. Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-90. 
 316. Id. at 692. 
 317. Bd. of Cty. Cmmrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 432 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“As a purely 
linguistic matter, a municipality, which can act only through its employees, might be said to have 
‘subject[ed]’ a person or to have ‘cause[d]’ that person to have been ‘subjected’ to a loss of rights when 
a municipality’s employee acts within the scope of his or her employment.”). 
 318. See, e.g. Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 487 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment) (“This is not a hard case. If there is any difficulty, it arises from the 
problem of obtaining a consensus on the meaning of the word “policy”—a word that does not appear in 
the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statutory provision that we are supposed to be construing.”); Oklahoma 
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 841-42 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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independently responsible.319  Debates have raged over the significance 
of Congress’s rejection of the Sherman Amendment, and the extent to 
which it suggests that Congress did not want cities to be liable under the 
new law.320  
This Article does not attempt to repeat those debates or to 
independently argue that the legislative history shows that Congress 
“really intended” for cities to be liable in respondeat superior or to be 
able to invoke qualified immunity.  The legislative history of § 1983 is 
indeterminate, as has been argued by several scholars321 and as is 
attested to by the fact that at various times the Justices have persuasively 
argued that that history forbids any municipal liability,322 allows it but 
only when the violation is traceable to municipal policy or custom,323 or 
allows full respondeat superior liability.324 
In particular, the argument that the legislative history supports 
imposing respondeat superior on cities has been developed at length by 
several scholars,325 was advanced by Justice Stevens in a number of 
opinions,326 and was endorsed by Justice Breyer’s opinion in Brown v. 
County Commissioners.327   
As for qualified immunity, it is unclear to what extent the Court has 
relied or currently relies on the legislative history of § 1983 in crafting 
 
 319. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at  665-90, 719-25; Monroe,  365 U.S. at 180-87; Achtenberg, 
Taking History Seriously, supra note 65, at 2203-13; Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the 
Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L. Q. 409, 413 n. 15 (1978). 
 320. See, e.g. Bd. of Cty. Cmmrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 434-37 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(critiquing the Court’s reliance on the rejection of the Sherman Amendment as its main reason for 
rejecting respondeat superior liability for municipal defendants); Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously, 
supra note 65, at 2203-13 (arguing that the rejection of the Sherman Amendment was actually entirely 
consistent with the 19th century understanding of respondeat superior); Jack M. Beermann, Municipal 
Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 635 (1999) (“Given the diversity of 
views within Congress on the desirability of the Sherman Amendment, it is particularly dangerous to 
read the rejection of the Sherman Amendment as Congress rejecting anything more than the actual terms 
of the various versions of that amendment itself.”).  
 321. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 320, at 635; Michael Wells, The Past and the Future of 
Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation to Common Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REV. 53, 54 
(1986) (arguing for ending reliance on legislative intent in interpreting section 1983). 
 322. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180-87; Monell, 436 U.S. at 719-725 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 323. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-692. 
 324. Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 489-90 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 444 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 325. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 627, 635 (1999).  
 326. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834-844 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Pembauer v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 489-491 (1986) (Stevens J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
 327. Bd. of Cty. Cmmrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 434-37 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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the doctrine.328  The Court relied in crafting the defense on the notion 
that Congress must have intended to import common-law immunities 
into the statute, because it did not express an intent to abolish those 
immunities.329  However, the Court did not rely directly on legislative 
history to support that reasoning.  Nonetheless, there is support in the 
legislative history of the statute for the position that municipalities 
should be entitled to the benefit of the qualified immunity defense.  
Justice Powell’s dissent in Owen gathers the evidence, arguing that 
legislators’ objections to the rejected Sherman Amendment  “apply with 
equal force to strict municipal liability under §1983.”330  Justice 
Powell’s reading of the legislative history, which was persuasive enough 
to gather four votes at the time, provides justification for extending to 
municipal defendants the benefit of the qualified immunity defense.  
3. Common Law  
In interpreting the sparse text of § 1983,  the Court has also frequently 
relied on analogies to the common law of torts to answer open questions 
about the statute’s framework for liability.331 The Court has reasoned 
that, in drafting the statute in 1871, Congress would have been mindful 
of and intended to adopt the common law rules of tort law as they 
existed at that time.332  More specifically, the Court has reasoned that 
Congress would have intended to import into the statute well-established 
common law immunities and defenses, which is the basis for the Court’s 
creation of the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity under the 
statute.333 Further, in the past, the Court has occasionally expressed the 
 
 328. Kit Kinports, Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, supra note 42, at 62  (“[T]he Court no 
longer engages in any pretense that its qualified immunity rulings  are interpreting the congressional 
intent underlying § 1983.”); Eric A Harrington, Judicial Misuse of History and §1983: Toward a 
Purpose-Based Approach, 85 TEX. L. REV. 999 (2007) (“the Court has recently shied away from using 
legislative history in construing § 1983”). 
 329. See, e.g.,  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) ( “Certain immunities were so 
well established in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, that ‘we presume that Congress would have 
specifically so provided had it wished to abolish’ them.”); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 
U.S. 58, 67 (1989) (“[I]n enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established 
immunities or defenses under the common law.”).  For criticisms of this logic, see, e.g., David 
Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for Legislative 
Will, 86  NW. U. L. REV. 497, 522 (1992); Richard A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 
1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741, 778 (1987).  
 330. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 674 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 331. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 627, 644 (1999) (explaining the ways in which the Court has consulted common law “to round 
out the contours of the §1983 remedy”). 
 332. See e.g. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363 (2012) (describing how the Court examines 
common law analogs as reference to set the scope of immunity under section 1983). 
 333. See, e.g., Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268, (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976). 
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view that the interpretation of § 1983 in light of tort principles should 
extend also to modern developments in tort law. Most notably, an 
analogy with the development of strict liability in tort law was one 
reason that the Owen Court decided that municipal governments should 
not be able to invoke the qualified immunity defense.334  
The Court has certainly not modeled its doctrine upon common law 
unfailingly, without exception, or without modification.335  Justices have 
noted at times, both approvingly and disapprovingly, that the Court is 
not really bound by common law when it interprets the statute.336 
Furthermore, scholars have critiqued the Court for fainthearted 
faithfulness to common law.337 Nonetheless, justification by analogy to 
the common law of torts is one way the Court has and could justify 
changes to its § 1983 doctrine.338 
Both the imposition of respondeat superior on municipal defendants 
and the extension of qualified immunity to those defendants can be 
justified by analogies to the common law of torts. First, as others have 
argued, consulting common law supports subjecting municipal 
defendants to respondeat superior liability.  Respondeat superior was 
well-established as of 1871,339 and there is considerable evidence that 
respondeat superior liability extended to cities at that time.340  
 
 334. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (“Doctrines of tort law have 
changed significantly over the past century, and our notions of governmental responsibility should 
properly reflect that evolution . . . . [T]he principle of equitable loss-spreading has joined fault as a 
factor in distributing the costs of official misconduct.”). 
 335. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644-45 (1987) (“[W]e have never suggested 
that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the often arcane 
rules of the common law.”); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (“‘[T]he precise contours of 
official immunity’ need not mirror the immunity at common law” (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U. S. 635, 645 (1987)).  
 336. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Once it is 
established that the common law of 1871 provides us with no real guidance on this question, we should 
turn to the policies underlying §1983 to determine which rule best accords with those policies.”);  Ziglar 
v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1870-71 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) 
(arguing that the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence has deviated from faithfully applying 
common law precedents). 
 337. See, e.g., Michael Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 
MISS. L.J. 157 (1998) (arguing that Court has been inconsistent in its reliance on and application of 
common law rules). 
 338. See, e.g., Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 363 (“Congress intended [§1983] to be construed in the light 
of common-law principles,”); Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389 (2012). 
 339. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 835-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that 
as of 1871 “the doctrine of respondeat superior was well recognized” and “had specifically been applied 
to municipal corporations”); Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously, supra note 65, at 2196-2202 
(demonstrating at length that the common law understanding of and rationales for respondeat superior 
in 1871 would have allowed for respondeat superior liability to be imposed on municipal defendants); 
Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 645 
(1999) (noting that vicarious liability was well established in tort law in 1871). 
 340. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 836 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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Common law also supports allowing the municipal defendant to 
invoke the individual officer-employee’s qualified immunity defense. In 
Owen, the court examined common law analogs and concluded that 
municipalities had no claim on an immunity defense because there was 
no tradition of extending to municipal corporations an immunity based 
on the good faith of its officers.341  Justice Powell’s dissent persuasively 
argued against that reading of the common law, demonstrating that 
“[t]he Court’s decision also runs counter to the common law in the 19th 
century, which recognized substantial tort immunity for municipal 
actions.”342 He demonstrated that, at common law, most states 
recognized at least a good faith immunity for municipal defendants 
against liability for constitutional torts.343 
Further, another common law argument can be made based on the 
proposal to shift the basis of municipal liability from “policy and 
custom” to respondeat superior.  Since the municipality is being held 
liable based on the conduct of its officers,344 it should, therefore, be 
allowed the benefit of the officer’s defense.  Since Owen, the Court has 
made clear that a municipal defendant may be held liable only if there 
was a rights violation by some individual officer.345 The conduct and 
violation of the officer are the bases of the municipal defendant’s 
liability.346 This should mean, in turn, that the municipal defendant 
should get the benefit of the officer’s affirmative defenses.  There is 
support for this principle in the common law of torts because generally, 
in tort law, a defendant sued in respondeat superior is entitled to claim 
the benefit of affirmative defenses available to the employee whose 
conduct is the basis for the plaintiff’s suit.347 Justice Powell’s dissent, 
together with the common-law principle that vicarious-liability 
defendants are entitled to the benefit of their employees’ affirmative 
defenses, could amply justify changing the doctrine so that municipal 
 
 341. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1980). 
 342. Id. at 677. 
 343. Id.  
 344. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). 
 345. Id. at 799. 
 346. See, e.g., Achtenberg, supra note 65, at 2208. 
 347. See, e.g., 53 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 281 (2012) (“in most circumstances, the [respondeat 
superior] defendant will be able to raise any defenses that would be available to the employee in a direct 
action to establish his or her liability for negligence.”); Henisse v. First Transit, Inc., 220 P.3d 980, 988 
(Colo. App. 2009) (reversed on other grounds) (employer may raise substantive defenses available to 
employee); Rude v. The Dancing Crab at Washington Harbour, LP, 245 F.R.D. 18 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(employer allowed to assert substantive defenses available to employee); Lathrop v. Healthcare Partners 
Medical Group, 114 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1423, 8 Cal.Rptr. 3d at 675-76 (2004) (“[b]ecause the vicarious 
liability of the employer is wholly dependent upon or derived from the liability of the employee, any 
substantive defense that is available to the employee inures to the benefit of the employer.”); Freeman v. 
Churchhill, L.A. 20041, 30 Cal.2d 453, 461, 183 P.2d 4 (1947) (same). 
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defendants are allowed to assert the qualified immunity defense. 
B. The Proposal Is Feasible Because the Court’s § 1983 Doctrine Is 
Policy-Driven, the Court Likes Qualified Immunity, and the Proposal Is 
a Compromise. 
The proposed changes are not merely possible, but they are feasible, 
in the sense that the Court might actually make them, for three reasons.  
First, the Court has consistently changed and even reversed its § 1983 
doctrine based on its changing views as to what rules will best further 
the policies of the statute; this suggests it might also make the changes 
proposed by this Article if the policy arguments seem compelling.348 
Second, the Court has been markedly enthusiastic about the doctrine of 
qualified immunity, while it has been much more equivocal about its 
Monell doctrine.  Finally, the proposed changes are appealing because 
they can be understood as a compromise that improves efficiency and 
furthers federalism without massively expanding or contracting 
municipal liability—municipal defendants will be newly subjected to 
respondeat superior, but will also be newly entitled to invoke the very 
powerful qualified immunity defense.349  
1. The Court Has Proven Willing to Make Significant Policy-Driven 
Changes to § 1983 Doctrine  
Implementing the changes proposed in this Article would require the 
Court to reverse two of its precedents interpreting § 1983—Monell and 
Owen.  But in interpreting § 1983 and in contrast to more routine 
statutory interpretation, the Court has proven willing to make large 
doctrinal changes without any Congressional amendment of the 
statute.350 In particular, since the birth of modern § 1983 doctrine in 
Monroe v. Pape, the Court has reversed its position on a number of 
fundamental doctrinal points. These include reversing its position to 
allow liability for municipal and local governments under § 1983,351 
changing from a subjective to an objective approach to qualified 
 
 348. See, e.g., Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 490 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment) (“in construing the scope of §1983, the Court has sometimes 
referred to ‘considerations of public policy.’”) 
 349. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (stating that the qualified immunity defense 
should protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”). 
 350. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
1479, 1537 (1987) (describing development of §1983 doctrine as an example of “statutory common 
law”). 
 351. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) 
(reversing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)). 
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immunity,352 and switching the qualified-immunity analysis from a rigid 
“order of battle” to a discretionary approach that allows courts to 
consider whether law was “clearly established” before deciding whether 
the constitution was violated.353 
Because the doctrinal rules for § 1983 litigation are mostly not 
determined by the text of the statute,354 and are underdetermined by 
other sources like legislative history355 and common law,356 the Court 
has proven willing to change the rules when it has thought doing so was 
necessary to further the policy goals of the statute. Perhaps this is 
because it is an older, shorter statute that does not establish a full-blown 
regime of liability.  Perhaps it is because, while it is a statute, it is also a 
vehicle (probably the most important vehicle) for the enforcement of 
federal constitutional rights against state and local officials, and so some 
of the Court’s more-relaxed attitude towards stare decisis in 
constitutional cases357 bleeds through to its interpretation of § 1983.  
Whatever the reason, it seems fair to say that the Court’s approach to 
interpreting § 1983 is closer to federal common law making than to 
conventional statutory interpretation.358  This means, among other 
things, that the Court may be (and has been) more willing to reverse a 
doctrinal interpretation of the statute if it concludes the doctrine is not 
working well, or can be improved.359 Thus, if the policy arguments 
above are persuasive, the Court might be willing to change the doctrine 
 
 352. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982) (dispensing with the subjective qualified-
immunity inquiry of Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) to Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 
(1975)). 
 353. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235-36 (2009) (reversing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 
202 (2001)). 
 354. Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of 
Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 54-57 (1989) (noting the limits of the text in resolving interpretive questions 
about the section 1983 cause of action). 
 355. See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176-186, 224-225 (debate between majority and Justice 
Frankfurter in dissent over interpretation of section 1983 based on legislative history). 
 356. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644-45 (1987) (“[W]e have never suggested 
that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the often arcane 
rules of the common law.”); see also Michael Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the 
Common Law, 68 MISS. L.J. 157 (1998) (arguing that Court has been inconsistent in its reliance on and 
application of common law rules). 
 357. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (noting that stare decisis is weaker in 
constitutional cases “because correction through legislative action is practically impossible”).  
 358. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
1479, 1537 (1987) (describing development of §1983 doctrine as an example of “statutory common 
law”); but see Baude, supra note 16, at 35 (suggesting that the Court has not admitted that it interprets 
section 1983 as a “common law statute” in the same way as it does the Sherman Act).  
 359. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982) (switching to purely objective 
test for qualified immunity would further policy goal of allowing qualified immunity to be resolved 
earlier in the litigation); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 240-41 (2009) (abandoning rigid two-step 
approach of Saucier would further values of flexibility, efficiency, and discretion).  
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to affect them.360  
2. The Court Is Very Enthusiastic About Qualified Immunity but Has 
Been Equivocal about Municipal Liability Doctrine  
Another reason the Court might be willing to make the proposed 
changes is that eliminating Monell liability and replacing it with 
qualified immunity aligns with the Court’s marked enthusiasm for 
qualified immunity; its more equivocal attitude towards its municipal 
liability cases. 
The Court has demonstrated increasing enthusiasm for the qualified 
immunity defense.  It has made it substantively more robust over 
time,361 and has afforded qualified immunity cases an almost uniquely 
privileged place on its docket,362 granting cases frequently and almost 
invariably ruling in defendants’ favor,363 while also consistently issuing 
summary reversals of plaintiff-friendly lower court rulings. 364 
Moreover, most of the Court’s defendant-friendly qualified-immunity 
decisions in the last ten years have not been decided by narrow 5-4 
majorities. Instead, the Court has repeatedly and enthusiastically 
endorsed the need for a robust rule of qualified immunity, in opinions 
that are usually at least 7-2 decisions, and frequently unanimous,365 in 
the defendant’s favor.  While several scholars have criticized this 
trend,366 the Court has shown few signs of questioning whether its 
qualified-immunity jurisprudence is too defendant-friendly or in need of 
pruning back.367  Further, Owen itself, which denied qualified immunity 
 
 360. This Article does not attempt to walk through the specific arguments the Court would need to 
make about stare decisis, in order to implement the proposed changes, but merely to observe that the 
Court seems willing to apply its stare decisis rules to overturn its precedents interpreting this particular 
statute.  See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 693-96 (“[W]e have never applied stare decisis mechanically to 
prohibit overruling our earlier decisions determining the meaning of statutes.”). 
 361. See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L. J. 229, 273-75 (2006) 
(arguing that Rehnquist and Roberts Courts are turning qualified immunity into an absolute immunity). 
 362. See Baude, supra note 16, at 41. 
 363. Id.  
 364. See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548 (2017) (per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.Ct. 
305 (2015) (per curiam); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015) (per curiam ); Carroll v. Carman, 135 
S.Ct. 348 (2014) (per curiam); Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3 (2013) (per curiam). 
 365. See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 13 (2014) (unanimous); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 
765 (2014) (unanimous); Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012) (7-2); Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223, (2009) (unanimous); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (8-1).  
 366. Baude, supra note 16, at 41; Kinports, supra note 42, at 62.  
 367. But see, e.g., Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1278 (2017) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg describing the Court’s 
frequent practice of summarily reversing plaintiff-friendly rulings on qualified immunity a “disturbing 
trend regarding the use of this Court’s resources.”); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1870 (2017) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting the Justice’s “growing concern 
with our qualified immunity jurisprudence”). 
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to municipal defendants, was a 5-4 decision, and the Court today is 
substantially friendlier to qualified immunity than the Court in 1980.  
The Court’s Monell doctrine, in contrast, has never garnered anything 
like the same enthusiasm at the Court.  Several of the earlier cases 
establishing the convoluted “policy and custom” doctrine were plurality 
opinions that could not garner a majority voice;368 even later decisions 
that solidified the doctrine by majority opinion were generally 5-4.369  
Four justices called for re-examining the Monell doctrine in Board of 
County Commissioners v. Brown, and two of them are still on the Court.   
Moreover, the Court’s lack of enthusiasm for the doctrine can also be 
seen by how few cases it grants involving Monell liability compared to 
qualified immunity.  The last one, Connick v. Thompson, was in 2011.370  
It is possible that this is because the Court perceives that the doctrine is 
working well, but in light of the earlier explanation of how complicated 
and hard-to-apply that doctrine is,371 it seems more likely to this author 
that the doctrine is such a mess that the Court is unwilling to take a case 
to sort it out. 
It is true that in Connick, five justices reaffirmed and made stricter the 
Monell requirements for showing policy and causation.372  However, the 
Court’s devotion to the “strict” causation and fault requirements of 
Connick, Canton, and Brown has been seem by them as justified by the 
need to prevent the imposition of massive strict respondeat superior 
liability on municipal defendants.373  In the quite different context of 
considering whether to eliminate the Monell doctrine while also 
allowing municipal defendants the benefit of the robust, and loved-by-
Justices qualified immunity defense, it is possible that one or more of 
these Justices might change their position.  This leads to the final 
argument that the change is feasible—its nature as a compromise.   
 
 368. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 
U.S. 469 (1986). 
 369. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 53 (2011); Bd. of Cty. Cmmrs v. Brown, 520 
U.S. 397, 399 (1997). 
 370. Connick, 563 U.S. 51. 
 371. See, e.g., Brown, 520 U.S. at 434-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Jeffries, The Liability Rule, 
supra note 13, at 235-36.  
 372. Four of those justices are still on the Court, and it seems unlikely that Justice Gorsuch would 
be significantly more liberal on this issue than Justice Scalia, whom he has replaced.  Cf. Shannon M. 
Grammel, Judge Gorsuch on Qualified Immunity, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 163 (March 2017) 
(analyzing then-Judge Gorsuch’s qualified immunity opinions and arguing that before his elevation he 
had a “robust—though not boundless—vision of qualified immunity”). 
 373. See e.g., Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 844 (1985), (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
that Court’s “policy” requirement under Monell is mainly driven by fear of bankrupting municipal 
corporations via strict respondeat superior liability); Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 746 F.3d 
782, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.). (Monell doctrine is best understood as a compromise designed 
to prevent excessive municipal liability).  
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3. The Proposal Has Appeal as A Compromise Solution  
Finally, the proposal is more feasible than simply adopting 
respondeat superior for cities, which some judges and most scholars 
have endorsed for a long time, because this Article’s proposal is more of 
a bargain (or compromise) that would move the doctrine in a positive 
direction by simplifying the litigation and offering something to both 
plaintiffs (no more need to prove “policy and custom” to hold cities 
liable; the “deep pocket” defendant is more likely to stay in the case) 
and defendants (cities now can invoke qualified immunity).  Rather than 
imposing on municipal defendants strict liability in respondeat 
superior374 or removing them from the litigation altogether in favor of 
suits against officers only,375 this proposal would keep those defendants 
in the case but allow them the benefit of the qualified immunity defense.   
Given the decades long trend of the Court making it harder for 
plaintiffs to recover in suits under §1983,376 and the likelihood of a 5-
justice conservative majority for at least the next four years, proposals to 
simply subject municipal defendants to strict respondeat superior 
liability are likely a nonstarter for the near term.377 It is very hard to 
imagine the current Court reversing Monell and imposing respondeat 
superior liability on cities with no corresponding change to mitigate the 
increased exposure of cities to tort liability under § 1983. But if the 
imposition of respondeat superior were accompanied by the extension 
of qualified immunity, the proposal could be more appealing or 
attractive, especially if it becomes clear to the Court that the Monell 
doctrine is too inefficient and complicated (for all the reasons explained 
above).  It was essentially this sort of reasoning that led the Court in 
Pearson v. Callahan to abandon the “two-step” of Saucier v. Katz378 in 
favor of allowing district courts the flexibility to choose whether to 
resolve cases based on “clearly established” without deciding whether 
there was a violation of constitutional law. 
There were four votes in Owen to afford qualified immunity to 
municipal defendants, and four votes in Brown to impose respondeat 
superior liability on those defendants.  Because of the compromise 
nature of doing both of those things at once, a “middle coalition” might 
be assembled to give five votes in favor of doing them at the same time.  
 
 374. Blum, The Maze, supra note 13, at 963-64. 
 375. Jeffries, The Liability Rule, supra note 13, at 240, 270. 
 376. Id. at 914; Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L. J. 229, 273-75 
(2006) (arguing that Rehnquist and Roberts Courts are turning qualified immunity into an absolute 
immunity). 
 377. See, e.g., Blum, The Maze, supra note 13, at 920.  
 378. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
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If the current, much-criticized Monell doctrine is indeed simply a 
“compromise rule” crafted by the Court to accommodate competing 
policy concerns,379 the proposed rule would be a better compromise, and 
so might feasibly be adopted by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argued that it would immediately improve the law of 42 
U.S.C. §1983 to replace the convoluted and hairsplitting regime of 
Monell liability for municipal defendants with a regime of respondeat 
superior accompanied by allowing municipal defendants the benefit of 
the same qualified immunity defense available to individual officers.  
Those two proposed changes would improve the efficiency of § 1983 
litigation by eliminating expensive and mostly irrelevant inquiries into 
municipal policies and customs.  They would give municipal defendants 
better incentives by eliminating the incentive to “know nothing” and 
replacing it with an incentive to monitor and prevent violations of 
clearly established law.  They would make recovery easier for plaintiffs 
with strong cases by making pleading and proof of municipal liability 
radically easier. Finally, they would further federalism by reducing 
federal court scrutiny and intrusion into municipal policy without 
absolving municipal defendants from responsibility for violations of 
clearly established constitutional rights. 
In addition to being sound policy, the proposed changes are both 
possible—because they can be justified by conventional sources of 
statutory interpretation—and feasible—because a middle bloc on a 
Court that is enthusiastic about qualified immunity and that has a history 
of reworking the doctrine might well see fit to accept a compromise that 
takes from municipal defendants by expanding their responsibility while 




 379. Shields, 746 F.3d at 791-92 (Posner, J.). 
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